Search posterous

Search all posts and users. Type a name, type a favorite song title, whatever! See what comes up.
  

More posterous blogs











More recommended blogs »

Here are posterous posts filed under security...

Stryker Combat Vehicle

The Department of Defense developed the "Stryker" series of vehicles to make our forces lighter, more flexible, and capable of rapid deployment. These vehicles were intended to give our troops a light tactical vehicle that they could rely upon. As soon as these vehicles began arriving in Iraq, they began saving lives.

Now that our enemies have seen how they work, is it now fair to say that the Stryker is obsolete? Or is it more accurate to say that it is the wrong vehicle for Afghanistan?

On July 5, the U.S. Army's 5th Stryker Brigade arrived in Kandahar province for a year-long tour of duty. The brigade was equipped with 350 Stryker combat vehicles, an eight-wheeled armored infantry carrier that has proven successful in Iraq and is popular with soldiers. It was the first time the Army had deployed Strykers to Afghanistan, but the country has proven unforgiving to the brigade. Thus far they have lost 21 of theirStrykersto improvised explosive devices (IEDs), at a cost of two dozen killed and more than 70 wounded. On Oct. 27, seven soldiers diedduring the bombing of a single Stryker vehicle.

Why are Strykers seemingly more vulnerable to improvised explosive attack in Afghanistan than they were in Iraq? Iraq has a much more developed road network than Afghanistan. A denser road network provided U.S. mission planners with more routes to choose from, complicating the enemy's roadside bombing effort. In Afghanistan by contrast, U.S. forces may be lucky to have one usable road to get from an assembly area to an objective. The standard counter-IED strategy is to constantly observe such roads for insurgent bomb-planting activity. Fewer roads would mean less for the Americans to observe, in theory making it easier to find the insurgent bomb-planters. But the level of surveillance assets in the 5th Brigade's area might not be at the same density that U.S. units have enjoyed lately in Iraq. In fact, Col. Harry D. Tunnell IV, the brigade commander, has called for more surveillance help.

The best solution to the problem of IEDs is to infiltrate, attack, and destroy the insurgent organizations that plant them. While that effort progresses, coalition forces can reduce the IED threat by 1) staying off the roads and 2) dispersing by putting fewer troops in a greater number of vehicles. Obvious solutions, but often impractical to implement.

Given Afghanistan's vast distances and low population density, movement by vehicles is essential. Helicopters bypass the roads but are expensive, few in number, and have their own risks. Off-road movement by heavy vehicles laden with troops and supplies in impractical. A new all-terrain mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle (M-ATV) may be promising for Afghanistan. An M-ATV carries five soldiers compared with the Stryker's 13 and may have better off-road capability. Compared to the Stryker, M-ATV would disperse soldiers in more vehicles and avoid some of the risks of being on Afghanistan's roads. 

That's all well and good, but it ignores one of the basic realities of why we're losing in Afghanistan--our reliance on roads and on ground transport hands the enemy the initiative. They can wait for us to move, and then attack whenever they wish to attack. They can build bigger and more lethal IEDs and attack us wherever they feel that they can maximize casualties and minimize risk to themselves.

If you're fighting a war where two barely-capable insurgents can spend three hours digging a hole where they can put several daisy-chained old mortar rounds, and then remote trigger that IED and kill 7 or 8 of our soldiers in their vehicle, you're fighting that war the wrong way.

In Vietnam, we moved hundreds, sometimes thousands of U.S. troops by helicopter, and that was forty years ago. You mean to say we can't find a way to get enough helicopters into Afghanistan to set up ambushes that will take the initiative away from the insurgents? If so, then I guess we really do need to pull our troops out.

Filed under: Afghanistan, Defense, Military, Security, War

Scott says...

I’m getting SO tired of this. Rather than asking ourselves why students feel the need to go around the restrictions – and treating those answers with the genuine respect and interest that they deserve – we treat our students like we might little street urchin pickpockets.

Alfie Kohn said in The Homework Myth: “The way we think about discipline seems to assume, as educational psychologist Marilyn Watson remarked, that Thomas Hobbes’ famous characterization of life also applies to children: They are nasty, brutish, and short.”

We are missing tremendous opportunities to foster efficacious, self-regulating, independent, thoughtful children. We reap what we sow…

My comment on Sylvia Martinez's post.

Filed under: education, safety, security, students, technology

Keep Dishonest Landlords at Bay with Your Camera! http://ow.ly/zZpM apartments technology diy landlords security

Filed under: apartments, diy, landlords, security, technology

1st Cavalary Division Patch

Don't let anyone tell you otherwise. Noah Schachtman at Wired found this today:

Before he allegedly killed a dozen and wounded 31 more at Ft. Hood, Maj. Nidal Hasan may have gone online to praise suicide bombers.

If one suicide bomber can kill 100 enemy soldiers because they were caught off guard that would be considered a strategic victory,” a commenter named “NidalHasan” wrote on this Scribd.com document about “Martydom in Islam.”

The comments — and others like them — drew the interest of federal law enforcement authorities, they tell the Associated Press’ Lara Jakes. An official investigation was never opened. But they did begin to pay attention to Hasan, an Army psychiatrist who was about to be deployed to Iraq.

The full comment at Scribd is as follows:

NidalHasanscribbled: There was a grenade thrown amongs a group of American soldiers. One of the soldiers, feeling that it was to late for everyone to flee jumped on the grave with the intention of saving his comrades. Indeed he saved them. He inentionally took his life (suicide) for a noble cause i.e. saving the lives of his soldier. To say that this soldier committed suicide is inappropriate. Its more appropriate to say he is a brave hero that sacrificed his life for a more noble cause. Scholars have paralled this to suicide bombers whose intention, by sacrificing their lives, is to help save Muslims by killing enemy soldiers. If one suicide bomber can kill 100 enemy soldiers because they were caught off guard that would be considered a strategic victory. Their intention is not to die because of some despair. The same can be said for the Kamikazees in Japan. They died (via crashing their planes into ships) to kill the enemies for the homeland. You can call them crazy i you want but their act was not one of suicide that is despised by Islam. So the scholars main point is that "IT SEEMS AS THOUGH YOUR INTENTION IS THE MAIN ISSUE" and Allah (SWT) knows best.

Now, I would grant the possibility that this was a mentally ill person, and his actions no doubt prove he is deranged. Was he a radical, bent on killing for some purpose, such as, making a political statement? There is evidence that Hasan did not want to go to Iraq. That may have triggered a reaction to resign his commission or try to get out of the military. Virtually any officer can simply leave the military. It ruins the person to do so, professionally, but they cando it. If Hasan did not want to go to Iraq, then he had more channels open to him to not go than an enlisted soldier. Anyone who wants to get out of the military can do so, provided they are willing to accept the consequences of doing so. If your choices are getting out dishonorably or Iraq, and you're willing to take that hit, then you take that hit. I don't buy the notion that he had to go. He seems to have figured that he had to act to stop others from going.

Hasan wanted to make a political statement, and so he did. There are numerous shopping centers around Fort Hood. There are numerous places where he, as a Major, could have gone. He decided to go for maximum infliction of casualties against Americans serving at Fort Hood, both as members of the military and as civilians working for the Department of Defense.

You can look at this:

Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, said military officials told her that the gunman was upset about his impending deployment.

It was unclear where Hasan was to be deployed. Hutchison said it was to be to Iraq, but retired Army Col. Terry Lee, who said he worked with Hasan, told Fox News that Hasan tried hard to prevent his pending deployment to Afghanistan.

Lee said Hasan had hoped President Barack Obama would pull troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, and that he got into frequent arguments with others in the military who supported the wars.

That, to me, supports the idea that this was terrorism--he was not only radicalized but was also openly defiant with his beliefs and speaking out about them. If anyone tries to spin it otherwise, remember--sympathy can sometimes count as much as being organized. While he may not have belonged to an organization, he did believe in a political philosophy at odds with the uniform that he wore. He was radicalized and believed himself "justified" for attacking the institution that was going to send him to Iraq.

For further evidence, there is this tidbit:

Hasan attended prayers regularly when he lived outside Washington, often in his Army uniform, said Faizul Khan, a former imam at a mosque Hasan attended in Silver Spring, Md. He said Hasan was a lifelong Muslim.

"I got the impression that he was a committed soldier," Khan said. He spoke often with Hasan about Hasan's desire for a wife.

On a form filled out by those seeking spouses through a program at the mosque, Hasan listed his birthplace as Arlington, Va., but his nationality as Palestinian, Khan said.

"I don't know why he listed Palestinian," Khan said, "He was not born in Palestine."

Why would he self-identify as a Palestinian if he wasn't one? You have a situation here where he has attacked and killed a great number of people; he has a history of saying that he supports a form of martyrdom; he is known to have wanted to avoid going to Iraq; and now he is self-identifying as someone he is not.

Mentally ill, certainly. And a terrorist to boot.

Filed under: Defense, Military, News, Religion, Security, Terrorism, War, War on Terror

tony says...

From this post over at GottaBeMobile I discovered that you can find out what Google knows about you by going to the Dashboard. You need to be logged in with the Google account about which you want information.

Filed under: Privacy, Security

sarahebourne says...

There are so many nifty Twitter tools out there, but my enthusiasm was always dampened for the ones that asked for my Twitter username and password. Why on Earth would I trust them? If they were really that good, I would use them and then immediately change my password.

Then Twitter introduced OAuth, named for a shortening of "open authentication". Instead of giving them my credentials, I told Twitter that it was okay to access my account. Very clever, and so much less risk.

Or so I thought. When you grant access to your account, you are not granting it for just that one time. Your permission continues, even if you change your password. Some of the recent "DM" account hacks have been attributed to a service taking advantage of permission granted via OAuth, so we are back where we started: we have to trust a service before we can find out if it is worthwhile.

Fortunately, there is a fix.

Log in to your Twitter account on the web and select the "Settings" link. See the tab on the right for "Connections"? That lists all of the third parties to whom you have given access with OAuth. Now go through the list and click on the "Revoke Access" link under the description for each service. This isn't blocking: you can give permission again if and when you visit that service the next time.

The integrity of your Twitter stream is entirely up to you, so remember to:

·       Use strong passwords.

·       Change your password periodically.

·       Revoke access to third party services immediately after using them.

Filed under: OAuth, security, Twitter

sighnpen says...

Shockwave Playerに深刻な脆弱性、Adobeが対処 - ITmedia News

Filed under: security

23narchy says...

Johan Spanner for The New York Times

A device used by Iraqi forces to detect bombs and other weapons at checkpoints has been called useless by the American military.

By ROD NORDLAND

Published: November 3, 2009

BAGHDAD — Despite major bombings that have rattled the nation, and fears of rising violence as American troops withdraw, Iraq’s security forces have been relying on a device to detect bombs and weapons that the United States military and technical experts say is useless.

The small hand-held wand, with a telescopic antenna on a swivel, is being used at hundreds of checkpoints in Iraq. But the device works “on the same principle as a Ouija board” — the power of suggestion — said a retired United States Air Force officer, Lt. Col. Hal Bidlack, who described the wand as nothing more than an explosives divining rod.

Still, the Iraqi government has purchased more than 1,500 of the devices, known as the ADE 651, at costs from $16,500 to $60,000 each. Nearly every police checkpoint, and many Iraqi military checkpoints, have one of the devices, which are now normally used in place of physical inspections of vehicles.

With violence dropping in the past two years, Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has taken down blast walls along dozens of streets, and he contends that Iraqis will safeguard the nation as American troops leave.

But the recent bombings of government buildings here have underscored how precarious Iraq remains, especially with the coming parliamentary elections and the violence expected to accompany them.

The suicide bombers who managed to get two tons of explosives into downtown Baghdad on Oct. 25, killing 155 people and destroying three ministries, had to pass at least one checkpoint where the ADE 651 is typically deployed, judging from surveillance videos released by Baghdad’s provincial governor. The American military does not use the devices. “I don’t believe there’s a magic wand that can detect explosives,” said Maj. Gen. Richard J. Rowe Jr., who oversees Iraqi police training for the American military. “If there was, we would all be using it. I have no confidence that these work.”

The Iraqis, however, believe passionately in them. “Whether it’s magic or scientific, what I care about is it detects bombs,” said Maj. Gen. Jehad al-Jabiri, head of the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate for Combating Explosives.

Dale Murray, head of the National Explosive Engineering Sciences Security Center at Sandia Labs, which does testing for the Department of Defense, said the center had “tested several devices in this category, and none have ever performed better than random chance.”

The Justice Department has warned against buying a variety of products that claim to detect explosives at a distance with a portable device. Normal remote explosives detection machinery, often employed in airports, weighs tons and costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. The ADE 651’s clients are mostly in developing countries; no major country’s military or police force is a customer, according to the manufacturer.

“I don’t care about Sandia or the Department of Justice or any of them,” General Jabiri said. “I know more about this issue than the Americans do. In fact, I know more about bombs than anyone in the world.”

He attributed the decrease in bombings in Baghdad since 2007 to the use of the wands at checkpoints. American military officials credit the surge in American forces, as well as the Awakening movement, in which Iraqi insurgents turned against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, for the decrease.

Aqeel al-Turaihi, the inspector general for the Ministry of the Interior, reported that the ministry bought 800 of the devices from a company called ATSC (UK) Ltd. for $32 million in 2008, and an unspecified larger quantity for $53 million. Mr. Turaihi said Iraqi officials paid up to $60,000 apiece, when the wands could be purchased for as little as $18,500. He said he had begun an investigation into the no-bid contracts with ATSC.

Jim Mitchell, the head of ATSC, based in London, did not return calls for comment.

The Baghdad Operations Command announced Tuesday that it had purchased an additional 100 detection devices, but General Rowe said five to eight bomb-sniffing dogs could be purchased for $60,000, with provable results.

Checking cars with dogs, however, is a slow process, whereas the wands take only a few seconds per vehicle. “Can you imagine dogs at all 400 checkpoints in Baghdad?” General Jabiri said. “The city would be a zoo.”

Speed is not the only issue. Colonel Bidlack said, “When they say they are selling you something that will save your son or daughter on a patrol, they’ve crossed an insupportable line into moral depravity.”

Last year, the James Randi Educational Foundation, an organization seeking to debunk claims of the paranormal, publicly offered ATSC $1 million if it could pass a scientific test proving that the device could detect explosives. Mr. Randi said no one from the company had taken up the offer.

ATSC’s promotional material claims that its device can find guns, ammunition, drugs, truffles, human bodies and even contraband ivory at distances up to a kilometer, underground, through walls, underwater or even from airplanes three miles high. The device works on “electrostatic magnetic ion attraction,” ATSC says.

To detect materials, the operator puts an array of plastic-coated cardboard cards with bar codes into a holder connected to the wand by a cable. “It would be laughable,” Colonel Bidlack said, “except someone down the street from you is counting on this to keep bombs off the streets.”

Proponents of the wand often argue that errors stem from the human operator, who they say must be rested, with a steady pulse and body temperature, before using the device.

Then the operator must walk in place a few moments to “charge” the device, since it has no battery or other power source, and walk with the wand at right angles to the body. If there are explosives or drugs to the operator’s left, the wand is supposed to swivel to the operator’s left and point at them.

If, as often happens, no explosives or weapons are found, the police may blame a false positive on other things found in the car, like perfume, air fresheners or gold fillings in the driver’s teeth.

On Tuesday, a guard and a driver for The New York Times, both licensed to carry firearms, drove through nine police checkpoints that were using the device. None of the checkpoint guards detected the two AK-47 rifles and ammunition inside the vehicle.

During an interview on Tuesday, General Jabiri challenged a Times reporter to test the ADE 651, placing a grenade and a machine pistol in plain view in his office. Despite two attempts, the wand did not detect the weapons when used by the reporter but did so each time it was used by a policeman.

“You need more training,” the general said.

Riyadh Mohammed contributed reporting.

 

Filed under: blair, bomb, bush, illegal war, iraq, magick, security

(download)

Filed under: computing, security

nileshbabu says...

1. Don't start from scratch
2. Use social media policies to raise security awareness
3. Use social media access to raise security's positive profile within the organization
4. Be prepared for the next phase

For details - read here.

Filed under: infosec, policy, security, social media, tips