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Israel Seizes Iranian Arms Bound For Hezbollah, Say Officials

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/04/israel-seizes-iranian-arm_n_345104.html

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Elecciones en el Medio Oriente

Líbano e Irán, dos países controversiales y de suma importancia en el Medio Oriente se midieron en las urnas para elegir nuevo parlamento y presidente respectivamente. Los resultados en Líbano fueron favorables para la coalición pro-occidental contra pronóstico, coalición llamada “14 de Marzo” que obtuvo 71 puestos, mientras que Hezbollah obtuvo sólo 57 puestos en el parlamento. Por otro lado están los resultados en Irán, donde a pesar de que los sondeos daban como ganador al líder opositor del movimiento reformista Mir Hussein Moussavi (candidato que simpatiza con occidente), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fue reelecto como presidente.

Occidente estuvo muy pendiente de ambas elecciones, son dos países conflictivos y a la vez tienen gran influencia en el mundo musulmán. Irán abiertamente financia grupos terroristas, desarrolla un programa nuclear (no pacífico) y amenaza con borrar del mapa a un estado democrático (Israel), mientras que Líbano presenta constantes conflictos internos que repercuten en la región. Son dos países que chocan constantemente con Occidente e Irán particularmente tiene como objetivo principal dominar en el Medio Oriente, es parte de la estrategia que se ha empleado desde la revolución Iraní en 1.979. Rafael Bardají (columnista del periódico ABC) caracteriza a Irán de la siguiente manera: “En su vertiente externa conlleva un germen revolucionario, porque aspira convertirse en el líder indiscutido del mundo musulmán y en potencia hegemónica regional y mundial”.

Entonces, hasta que punto estas elecciones hubiesen cambiado el panorama con Occidente de ganar los partidos pro-occidentales?. Desde mi punto de vista, Líbano puede ser más flexible por la diversidad de su población, es un país que cuenta con un 60% de musulmanes y un 40 % de cristianos, los musulmanes a su vez están compuestos por Chiítas y Sunitas donde mayormente son los Chiítas quienes apoyan al Hezbollah. Entonces estos 71 puestos que ganaron en el parlamento refleja el rechazo a la política terrorista y de violencia que emplea Hezbollah, es decir, creo que están más preparados para cambiar sus actuales políticas por unas más abiertas y democráticas que los acercaría a Occidente. Por el contrario, veo que en Irán las cosas van a ser más complejas, el hecho de que el partido reformista esté abierto al diálogo con Occidente, no significa que vayan a cambiar su estrategia como país que quiere dominar la región, es decir, su objetivo sería el mismo, pero capaz un poco más lento. El programa nuclear no lo empezó Ahmadinejad, lo comenzó su predecesor Jatami, que pertenece al mismo partido político que Moussavi.

El “ganador” de Irán fue Ahmadinejad, un individuo que no es hipócrita y que no esconde la verdad de lo que piensa el fundamentalismo islámico. Después de este resultado Barack Obama y Joe Biden tendrán que cambiar su estrategia con Irán, al igual que el Medio Oriente.  

Gracias a Deborah y Roy por la información que me suministraron.

Fuentes: ABC, www.elmundo.es, www.nytimes.com, www.stratfor.com

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Obama Wins An Election In The Middle East

Lebanon's voters gave the White House the victory it wanted -- with a lot of help from Hezbollah.

President Barack Obama's speech in Cairo last Thursday may already have borne fruit. His call for political moderates in the Muslim world to fight extremism may have helped tip the weekend's parliamentary elections in Lebanon to the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance. Obama did not explicitly call for the defeat of Hezbollah in the elections, but the Lebanese already knew where the administration's sympathies lay. His speech came three weeks after a Beirut visit by Vice President Joe Biden in which Biden warned at a news conference, "We will evaluate the shape of our assistance programs based on the composition of the new government and the policies it advocates."

Read more: http://globaldevelopmentnews.blogspot.com/2009/06/obama-wins-election-in-middle-east.html

Tags: Biden, Obama, Salon, Lebanon election, Hariri, Damascus, Global Development news, Hezbollah, Lebanese, Nasrallah, Christians, Sunnis, Samir Geagea, Lebanese election, 

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Hezbollah Implicated in Hariri Murder

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Sunitas Vs Chiítas

By Daniel Rosenfeld

El Islam es una de las 3 grandes religiones monoteístas y representa hoy día la cuarta parte de la población mundial, ubicándose mayormente en el medio oriente y norte de África. Cuando Mahoma muere, el Islam se divide en tres sectas o ramas: Sunitas, Chiítas y Jarayíies. Según cada una de estas ramas, el predecesor de Mahoma como líder del Islam es diferente y por ello hoy día existe una rivalidad entre estas que se derivan en conflictos de pequeña y gran escala.

Los medios de comunicación, en general, no comentan mucho sobre los conflictos internos del Islam, hacen mucho más énfasis a la guerra contra el terrorismo y conflicto árabe-israelí, logrando así pasar a segundo plano eventos que podrían impactar negativamente en la región o dentro de la civilización musulmana.

Los Sunitas representan aproximadamente el 80% de la población musulmana, mientras que los Chiítas el 15%. Entre aquellos países en donde los Sunitas son mayoría se encuentran: Egipto, Arabia Saudita, Jordania, Siria y Afganistán, mientras que los países con mayoría Chiíta son: Irán, Irak, Bahrein y sur de Líbano. Es decir, los países con más influencia y liderazgo en el medio oriente son Egipto y Arabia Saudita del lado Sunita e Irán del lado Chiíta (excluyendo a Irak debido a problemas internos después de su invasión por parte de los norteamericanos)

A finales de los 70 y principios de los 80 ocurren acontecimientos donde Sunitas y Chiítas toman una posición en la guerra fría. En 1.979 el Ayatolá Jomeini toma el poder en Irán luego del derrocamiento del Sah por descontento popular y se implementa un régimen fundamentalista islámico, tomando así una posición antiamericana por haber tenido una estrecha relación con el Sah durante su gobierno. Por otro lado, Sunitas Afganos toman una posición anticomunista por la invasión soviética. Es decir, se ven claras diferencias políticas entre estas dos sectas.

Incluso durante la guerra entre Irán e Irak (1.980-1.988) la guerra fría participó activamente. La URSS vendía armas a los iraníes mientras que Irak recibía irónicamente apoyo por parte de Occidente (principalmente de parte de EEUU). Esta guerra se produce a pesar de que Irak (como comento anteriormente) es de mayoría Chiíta, sin embargo, Saddam Hussein (presidente de Irak para ese momento) era Sunita y controlaba el país con mano dura y por medio de un régimen laico.

Hoy día considero que existen 3 conflictos internos importantes dentro del Islam: 1- La fuerte división en los territorios palestinos, donde el partido Fatah (Sunita) controla Cisjordania y la organización terrorista Hamas (Financiado por Irán) controla la Franja de Gaza. 2- Los intensos y constantes enfrentamientos dentro del territorio Iraquí entre Chiítas y Sunitas (y en menor grado los Kurdos con la idea de crear su propio estado) que se desataron tras la invasión. 3- El descarado financiamiento por parte de Irán a la organización terrorista Hezbollah (Chiítas ubicados en el sur del Líbano), organización que silenciosamente intenta desestabilizar gobiernos Sunitas como el Egipcio. Los 2 primeros ya han dejado innumerables víctimas, sin embargo el tercero podría producir enfrentamiento entre dos estados (Irán-Egipto) y gestarse un conflicto de mayor escala.

Al mencionar estos conflictos observamos como actualmente Irán es el mayor responsable de los enfrentamientos entre Chiítas y Sunitas, cuenta con un músculo financiero (por la bonanza petrolera) que le permite sustentar grupos terroristas y estimular la violencia en el medio oriente y por lo visto no hay una fuerza mayor en la región que pueda hacerle frente.

Mientras hayan entes-estados-naciones alimentando el odio y la intolerancia, los enfrentamientos se perpetuarán en el medio oriente y en el mundo musulmán.

Fuentes: www.abc.com - http://www.opendemocracy.net - www.wikipedia.org

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A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century

Shortly before the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush was photographed holding a copy of Eliot Cohen's "Supreme Command," a book that argued, per Clemenceau, that war was too important to be left to the generals. It was a picture of reassurance, though Mr. Bush was slow to take the lesson: Only with the surge did he finally overrule the Pentagon brass to turn America's fortunes in the Iraq war around.

I would feel similarly reassured today to see President Barack Obama with a copy of military futurist Andrew F. Krepinevich's "7 Deadly Scenarios." Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates would do well to put it on their reading lists, too. And so should you.

As the title suggests, Mr. Krepinevich's concern is with the worst that can plausibly happen to the U.S., geopolitically speaking, within the next decade. What's plausible? Well, Manhattan drowning under a global-warming induced flood isn't, at least in this volume. But Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists is plausible. Indeed, to judge from the Taliban's recent territorial gains in Pakistan, it may happen sooner than Mr. Krepinevich thinks. Also plausible are nuclear bombs being detonated in American cities, without there being anyone against whom we can retaliate.

These are the obvious cases. But what happens if a global avian-flu pandemic overwhelms the U.S. health-care system and sends a desperate human tide coming up from Mexico? Or if a nuclear-armed Iran tempts war with Israel, as the U.S. stands helplessly by? Or if terrorists manage to disrupt the world's supply of oil in a big way?

Mr. Krepinevich runs through these and other scenarios in compellingly told "histories" of how each came to pass, typically culminating at the moment of crisis. His purpose isn't to make predictions or prescribe a remedy. But the scenarios vividly illustrate how recent changes in technology, demographics, economics and war-fighting can expose little-suspected, but easily exploited, chinks in America's armor. The scenarios are deadly, in other words, not so much because they might result in huge casualties (although some almost certainly will) but because there is so little we currently could do about them.

Imagine, for instance, that China decides to seize Taiwan by force, sometime around the year 2017. As Mr. Krepinevich sees it, China's leaders are likelier to make such a decision in a period of crisis, when nationalist fervor will have to substitute for faltering economic growth as a source of the regime's legitimacy. Thanks to brainstorms such as the one-child policy, China will soon be saddled with a dangerous imbalance between young and old, as well as with a surfeit of testosterone-fueled young men unable to find wives and eager for war.

Could Beijing succeed in that venture, against both Taipei's and Washington's opposition? Despite years of robust investment, China's military capabilities lag America's by a long mile. But not in every respect. China's military has adopted the concept of Shashoujian, or the "assassin's mace." The idea is to field relatively inexpensive weapons to disrupt America's expensive war-fighting capabilities, which rely heavily on satellite reconnaissance and networked digital communications systems.

Thus, in January 2007, the Chinese destroyed an orbiting satellite with a missile. The Chinese have also reportedly invested heavily in cyberwarfare tools that could enter U.S. computer networks undetected, only to be activated automatically when the Pentagon moved to a higher state of readiness. China has put a lot of money in submarines as well, one of which surfaced in the midst of a U.S. aircraft-carrier battle group in 2006, a warning if ever there was one of how vulnerable a $5 billion capital ship may be to a $1 million torpedo.

Such asymmetries and there are many others, including the increasing availability of precision-guided munitions to groups such as Hezbollah, suggest that the Pentagon ought to rethink some long-held assumptions about the kinds of strategies it needs to fight future conflicts and the weapons and tactics it needs to implement those strategies. Good luck with that. As Mr. Krepinevich notes, the U.S. Navy successfully war-gamed an attack on Pearl Harbor in 1932, but the military brass remained unconvinced that the day of the battleship had passed. A similar exercise in 2002 saw the U.S. Navy ripped to pieces by a simulated adversary, much like Iran, using speedboats, light flares, motorbikes and other low-tech equipment.

That's not to say that the Pentagon does no thinking about these scenarios, Mr. Krepinevich began his career as a military futurist within the ranks of the U.S. Army. In recent years in particular, the military has learned to cope with asymmetrical challenges with asymmetrical responses of its own, like the use of patronage and favors to bring Iraq's tribal leaders over to our side in the fight against al Qaeda. But the brilliant improvisations of the surge arrived nearly too late to save Iraq. When nuclear bombs go off in San Antonio, Chicago and Boston, as Mr. Krepinevich imagines in one scenario, will we have some concept of how to respond? Have we thought through the challenges of strategic deterrence in the age of stateless terrorism?

Put simply, will we adapt before it's too late? With good leadership, one would hope we could. Mr. Krepinevich cites a 2008 speech from Mr. Gates in which the defense secretary insists that "overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today." Uh, oh. Mr. Gates would have good reason to rethink that view, if only he found time to read this important book.

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Israel's Lebanon Disaster

Michael Oren's piece in the Wall Street Journal Israel's Lebanon Disaster is worth reading. The following is an excerpt:

"I had fought in war before but had never seen such intensive fire -- tracer bullets, rockets, artillery shells -- nor been assigned a more horrific detail. My unit was escorting the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed on the last night of the Second Lebanon War, a few hours before the U.N. cease-fire agreement took effect. None of us understood the purpose of this last-minute offensive or, indeed, many of the government's disastrous decisions during the war. We agreed that the burden of these failures would be borne by our leaders, military and civilians alike.

Now, a year and a half later, veterans of the war are demanding that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accept responsibility for its conduct -- or risk unraveling the consensus on which Israel's survival depends.

The war began on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah gunmen ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight and kidnapping two. Mr. Olmert's response, a large-scale campaign intended to crush Hezbollah and secure the soldiers' release, was supported by most Israelis until serious mismanagement of the war surfaced. While receiving inadequate or faulty equipment -- my rifle literally fell apart in my hands -- Israeli forces were denied permission to invade Southern Lebanon and neutralize the katyusha rockets that were pummeling Israeli cities. Instead, Israeli jets bombed the Lebanese routes through which Syria resupplied Hezbollah and destroyed the organization's Beirut headquarters.

These attacks obliterated much of Hezbollah's infrastructure and killed a fourth of its fighters, but they also laid waste to a large part of Lebanon, killing civilians and squandering Israel's initial international backing. Hundreds of rockets, meanwhile, continued to smash into northern Israel, displacing a half-million civilians. Only on Aug. 13, after a month of fighting and with a U.N. ceasefire already approved, did the government authorize a ground offensive into Lebanon. The operation achieved nothing, either militarily or diplomatically, and cost the lives of 33 Israeli troops.

In another country, perhaps, such blunders might result in the resignation of senior officers but not necessarily elected officials. In Israel, though, no one is above blame. Accountability for decision making is a tenet of the Zionist ethos on which the Jewish state is based and, unlike most nations, Israel has a citizens' army in which the great majority -- politicians included -- serve. Most uniquely, Israel confronts daily security dangers and long-term threats to its existence. Israelis can neither condone nor afford a prime minister who passes the buck to their army or shirks the onus of defense. The person who sends us into battle cannot escape responsibility for our fate."

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Israel's Lebanon Disaster

Michael Oren's piece in the Wall Street Journal Israel's Lebanon Disaster is worth reading. The following is an excerpt:

"I had fought in war before but had never seen such intensive fire -- tracer bullets, rockets, artillery shells -- nor been assigned a more horrific detail. My unit was escorting the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed on the last night of the Second Lebanon War, a few hours before the U.N. cease-fire agreement took effect. None of us understood the purpose of this last-minute offensive or, indeed, many of the government's disastrous decisions during the war. We agreed that the burden of these failures would be borne by our leaders, military and civilians alike.

Now, a year and a half later, veterans of the war are demanding that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accept responsibility for its conduct -- or risk unraveling the consensus on which Israel's survival depends.

The war began on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah gunmen ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight and kidnapping two. Mr. Olmert's response, a large-scale campaign intended to crush Hezbollah and secure the soldiers' release, was supported by most Israelis until serious mismanagement of the war surfaced. While receiving inadequate or faulty equipment -- my rifle literally fell apart in my hands -- Israeli forces were denied permission to invade Southern Lebanon and neutralize the katyusha rockets that were pummeling Israeli cities. Instead, Israeli jets bombed the Lebanese routes through which Syria resupplied Hezbollah and destroyed the organization's Beirut headquarters.

These attacks obliterated much of Hezbollah's infrastructure and killed a fourth of its fighters, but they also laid waste to a large part of Lebanon, killing civilians and squandering Israel's initial international backing. Hundreds of rockets, meanwhile, continued to smash into northern Israel, displacing a half-million civilians. Only on Aug. 13, after a month of fighting and with a U.N. ceasefire already approved, did the government authorize a ground offensive into Lebanon. The operation achieved nothing, either militarily or diplomatically, and cost the lives of 33 Israeli troops.

In another country, perhaps, such blunders might result in the resignation of senior officers but not necessarily elected officials. In Israel, though, no one is above blame. Accountability for decision making is a tenet of the Zionist ethos on which the Jewish state is based and, unlike most nations, Israel has a citizens' army in which the great majority -- politicians included -- serve. Most uniquely, Israel confronts daily security dangers and long-term threats to its existence. Israelis can neither condone nor afford a prime minister who passes the buck to their army or shirks the onus of defense. The person who sends us into battle cannot escape responsibility for our fate."

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Israel's Lebanon Disaster

Michael Oren's piece in the Wall Street Journal Israel's Lebanon Disaster is worth reading. The following is an excerpt:

"I had fought in war before but had never seen such intensive fire -- tracer bullets, rockets, artillery shells -- nor been assigned a more horrific detail. My unit was escorting the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed on the last night of the Second Lebanon War, a few hours before the U.N. cease-fire agreement took effect. None of us understood the purpose of this last-minute offensive or, indeed, many of the government's disastrous decisions during the war. We agreed that the burden of these failures would be borne by our leaders, military and civilians alike.

Now, a year and a half later, veterans of the war are demanding that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accept responsibility for its conduct -- or risk unraveling the consensus on which Israel's survival depends.

The war began on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah gunmen ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight and kidnapping two. Mr. Olmert's response, a large-scale campaign intended to crush Hezbollah and secure the soldiers' release, was supported by most Israelis until serious mismanagement of the war surfaced. While receiving inadequate or faulty equipment -- my rifle literally fell apart in my hands -- Israeli forces were denied permission to invade Southern Lebanon and neutralize the katyusha rockets that were pummeling Israeli cities. Instead, Israeli jets bombed the Lebanese routes through which Syria resupplied Hezbollah and destroyed the organization's Beirut headquarters.

These attacks obliterated much of Hezbollah's infrastructure and killed a fourth of its fighters, but they also laid waste to a large part of Lebanon, killing civilians and squandering Israel's initial international backing. Hundreds of rockets, meanwhile, continued to smash into northern Israel, displacing a half-million civilians. Only on Aug. 13, after a month of fighting and with a U.N. ceasefire already approved, did the government authorize a ground offensive into Lebanon. The operation achieved nothing, either militarily or diplomatically, and cost the lives of 33 Israeli troops.

In another country, perhaps, such blunders might result in the resignation of senior officers but not necessarily elected officials. In Israel, though, no one is above blame. Accountability for decision making is a tenet of the Zionist ethos on which the Jewish state is based and, unlike most nations, Israel has a citizens' army in which the great majority -- politicians included -- serve. Most uniquely, Israel confronts daily security dangers and long-term threats to its existence. Israelis can neither condone nor afford a prime minister who passes the buck to their army or shirks the onus of defense. The person who sends us into battle cannot escape responsibility for our fate."

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Israel's Lebanon Disaster

Michael Oren's piece in the Wall Street Journal Israel's Lebanon Disaster is worth reading. The following is an excerpt:

"I had fought in war before but had never seen such intensive fire -- tracer bullets, rockets, artillery shells -- nor been assigned a more horrific detail. My unit was escorting the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed on the last night of the Second Lebanon War, a few hours before the U.N. cease-fire agreement took effect. None of us understood the purpose of this last-minute offensive or, indeed, many of the government's disastrous decisions during the war. We agreed that the burden of these failures would be borne by our leaders, military and civilians alike.

Now, a year and a half later, veterans of the war are demanding that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accept responsibility for its conduct -- or risk unraveling the consensus on which Israel's survival depends.

The war began on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah gunmen ambushed an Israeli border patrol, killing eight and kidnapping two. Mr. Olmert's response, a large-scale campaign intended to crush Hezbollah and secure the soldiers' release, was supported by most Israelis until serious mismanagement of the war surfaced. While receiving inadequate or faulty equipment -- my rifle literally fell apart in my hands -- Israeli forces were denied permission to invade Southern Lebanon and neutralize the katyusha rockets that were pummeling Israeli cities. Instead, Israeli jets bombed the Lebanese routes through which Syria resupplied Hezbollah and destroyed the organization's Beirut headquarters.

These attacks obliterated much of Hezbollah's infrastructure and killed a fourth of its fighters, but they also laid waste to a large part of Lebanon, killing civilians and squandering Israel's initial international backing. Hundreds of rockets, meanwhile, continued to smash into northern Israel, displacing a half-million civilians. Only on Aug. 13, after a month of fighting and with a U.N. ceasefire already approved, did the government authorize a ground offensive into Lebanon. The operation achieved nothing, either militarily or diplomatically, and cost the lives of 33 Israeli troops.

In another country, perhaps, such blunders might result in the resignation of senior officers but not necessarily elected officials. In Israel, though, no one is above blame. Accountability for decision making is a tenet of the Zionist ethos on which the Jewish state is based and, unlike most nations, Israel has a citizens' army in which the great majority -- politicians included -- serve. Most uniquely, Israel confronts daily security dangers and long-term threats to its existence. Israelis can neither condone nor afford a prime minister who passes the buck to their army or shirks the onus of defense. The person who sends us into battle cannot escape responsibility for our fate."

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