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FLASHBACK (circa 1977): A rag tag group of freedom and liberty loving, peaceful individuals have been backed into a corner, facing insurmountable odds when an out of control Empire threatens to destroy their ENTIRE PLANET with the most powerful weapon ever constructed.

In the face of imminent defeat, after missing the mark several times already and suffering heavy losses, a single tactically ingenious maneuver by a previously unknown rookie, with an assist from a well known, highly experienced associate, lands the shot of the millennium, completely destroying the flag ship of the Empire!

Putting to rest once and for all the Empire's recently invented slogan, "Too Big To Fail".

To be continued...

We should be asking Congress, "Now what did you learn?".

Join me on www.TWITTER.com/s3d1t0r

Filed under: Bailout

Fuzilah says...

Full documentary here:
http://www.youtube.com/user/alexjoneschannel3#grid/user/0D01C6963BFCE25A

Filed under: bailout

markmadsen says...

via huffingtonpost.com

JPMorgan Chase: $3.6 billion in profits in the last quarter. Goldman Sachs: $3.03 billion. Analysts expect a string of sky-high profit announcements to follow from other major Wall Street banks, all of them squirreling that cash away for historic bonus payments to executives.

In other words, it's been a good year for government-sponsored enterprises -- known in the industry as GSEs.

Traditional GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been tagged as culprits in the financial collapse, with critics arguing that the institutions took on too much risk because their losses were guaranteed by the federal government. Such a situation, it was said, is unsustainable.

Today's GSEs have different names: AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America.

"That's how I look at them as an analyst. I treat Citi as a GSE. I feel bad, because I know a lot of people that work there and I know they're trying to turn it around, but between the loss sharing and the equity that will probably be consumed by the losses, it's going to be an expensive operation for the U.S. government," said Christopher Whalen, a financial analyst who co-founded Institutional Risk Analytics.

Even the Treasury Department has made the comparison. "The growth of the major financial firms over the past few decades -- including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the major investment banks -- also likely stemmed in part from the assumption by investors and counterparties that these firms would receive government assistance if they became troubled," assistant treasury secretary Michael Barr said at a speech earlier this month at the National Economists Club.

Implicit government sponsorship allows big banks to access capital cheaper than private banks. It also saves them money on insurance premiums. Why pay for guarantees that the banks can get free?

When Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch in January, it insisted on getting up to $118 billion in losses guaranteed by the U.S. government in exchange for going through with the takeover. BofA agreed to pay a 3.7 percent fee for the guarantee -- close to $4 billion.

At the end of September, it paid a fraction of that -- $425 million -- to the Treasury to get out of the deal. "The BoA folks are smart people," said economist Dean Baker of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. "Why pay for something you can get for free?" (BofA claims it escaped the deal so that it would be less reliant on government support -- though, of course, the implicit support has gone nowhere.)

A recent paper by Baker and economist Travis McArthur shows that the too-big-too-fail guarantee also allows GSE banks to access capital cheaper than regular banks. The difference over the last several quarters adds up to an annual $34.16 billion taxpayer subsidy to major banks -- roughly half of their projected profits. That subsidy is more than twice what taxpayers spend on the major welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families.

The report, "The Value of the 'Too Big to Fail' Big Bank Subsidy," is based on data compiled by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and compares the cost of capital for banks smaller and larger than $100 billion. For the 18 banks above that threshold, capital was cheaper by 0.78 percentage points from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the first two quarters of 2009. From the first quarter of 2000 through the fourth quarter of 2007, the spread had only averaged 0.29 points -- meaning that the gap increased by roughly half a percentage point.

During the early part of the decade, the previous recession also saw the spread widen, but by a smaller amount, the report notes. The circumstances were much different, as well: the past recession didn't include widespread fears of the insolvency of the biggest banks -- the type of concern that -- under a free-market theory -- should make capital cost more, not less, for such banks. Yet smaller banks, which played little role in the crisis, received fewer bailout dollars and are considered more financially stable, are the ones paying the price.

"Private banks can't compete with a GSE," said Whelan.

Major banks have been able to sell toxic assets to the Federal Reserve and also have access to capital at close-to-zero percent interest rates from the Fed. By using zero-percent money from the Fed and lending it back to the U.S. government by buying Treasuries that pay higher rates, banks can squeeze out an extra subsidy. But there is no way of knowing how much of that capital banks have taken advantage of because the Fed doesn't make the information available.

"The numbers in [the report] suggest that to a large extent the recent rise in the profitability of the TBTF banks may be attributable to the fact that they enjoy the protection of the government's backing at a time when the banking system as a whole continues to experience substantial strains," write Baker and McArthur. "This should concern policymakers, since it would imply that a substantial portion of the profits of the largest banks is essentially a redistribution from taxpayers to the banks, rather than the outcome of market transactions. It is not clear that Congress and the public would support this redistribution if they realized that it was taking place."

It's clear, in fact, that the TBTF situation has virtually no support at all.

"I can't comment specifically on BofA, but what it does illustrate is in the debate about the regulations that are coming before the banking committee, we're going to have to be very, very careful not to allow the situation to exist where implicitly there is a federal guarantee or a backup of any of these institutions by virtue of the things we've put into place to deal with some future crisis," Senate Republican Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona told HuffPost.

"If they're too big to fail, they're too big," former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan told the Council on Relations in New York on Thursday. Greenspan acknowledged that breaking up banks cuts directly against his free-market ideology and opposition to government interference, but said that there was no choice. "If you don't neutralize that, you're going to get a moribund group of obsolescent institutions which will be a big drain on the savings of the society...Failure is an integral part, a necessary part of a market system."

There is precedent for such a break up. "In 1911 we broke up Standard Oil. So what happened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole. Maybe that's what we need to do," Greenspan said.

Senate Democrats agree, too. "Too-big-to-fail is a doctrine that has to go," said Sen. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, a member of Democratic leadership. "We need to address the doctrine and essentially abolish this no-fault capitalism called too-big-to-fail."

Even JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon acknowledged in September, "It would be a very bad long-term policy error to have banks that are too big to fail."

What he meant, however, was that other banks shouldn't be allowed to grow as big as his own, not that his should be broken up. "By that I don't mean make the banks smaller. We're large because we have a reason to be large," he quickly added.

They have billions of reasons to be large, of course, but there is a simple way to reduce their size, Whelan said. Banks that fail or are approaching failure could require their creditors to convert to stock holders instead of having their investment covered by taxpayers. The politics of the solution are difficult, because bondholders have an immense amount of political power.

"We can do this short of bankruptcy if we want to be reasonable people, but nobody in Washington's got the balls to have this conversation, except for [FDIC head] Sheila Bair," said Whelan.

Allowing failed firms to carry on undermines the entire system, Whelan noted. "In a free market society, if you don't have terror along with the exuberance then you're not a free market," he said. "If we don't have the courage to make the bondholders -- who are really legally responsible here -- come in and play a part, then we're basically just socialists and we will have all the negative effects that the socialists have faced in Europe by subsidizing their banks, which is a dead banking system."

The administration's approach is less direct and begins with greater oversight and higher capital requirements for big banks. "Going forward, our strategy is to impose supervisory and capital charges that offset the benefits of perceived government subsidies. We must substantially reduce the moral hazard created by the perception that these subsidies exist," said Barr in the same speech.

Greenspan, however, said that wasn't enough. "I don't think merely raising the fees or capital on large institutions or taxing them is enough," Greenspan said. "I think they'll absorb that, they'll work with that, and it's totally inefficient and they'll still be using the savings." That puts Greenspan -- an Ayn Rand acolyte -- on record for more government intervention than advocated by Michael Barr, a longtime labor economist.

Rather than break up the financial firms, Treasury proposes that it be given authority to unwind major financial institutions when they run into trouble. If investors become convinced that the government will, in fact, exercise that new authority, then their investment isn't as safe and the implicit subsidy isn't as large.

From Barr's speech:

The final step in addressing the problem of moral hazard is to make sure that we have the capacity - as we do now for banks and thrifts - to break apart or unwind major non-bank financial firms in an orderly fashion that limits collateral damage to the system.

...

Under our proposed special resolution authority, the government would be able to seize control of the operations and management of a major financial firm that is in default or in danger of default, to act as a conservator or receiver for the firm, and to establish a bridge entity to effect an orderly sale of the firm or liquidation of its assets. In the main resolution authority is not about keeping these firms alive, it is about letting them fail - making sure that they fail in a way that causes less collateral damage to the economy and to the taxpayer.

It is imperative that we minimize the risks that taxpayers pay the price of any future rescue of the financial sector. Therefore, under our proposal, any losses that might be incurred by the government in this special resolution process would be recouped through assessments on other large financial firms.

In a speech directed at Wall Street in New York in September, President Obama put the banks on notice. "Those on Wall Street cannot resume taking risks without regard for consequences, and expect that next time, American taxpayers will be there to break their fall," Obama said.

Today's profit statements tell a different story: Yes, Mr. President, they can.

 

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

Obama And Brandeis

President Obama’s speech yesterday was disappointing.  As a diagnosis of the problems that let us into financial crisis, it was his clearest and best effort so far.  He didn’t say it was a rare accident for which no one is to blame; rather he placed the blame squarely on the structure, incentives, and actions of Wall Street.

But then he said: our regulatory reforms will fix that.  This is hard to believe.  And even the President seems to have his doubts, because he added a plea that – in the meantime – the financial sector should behave better.

The audience was comprised of our financial elite, but the Wall Street Journal reports “not one CEO from a top U.S. bank was in attendance” (p.A4).  How’s that for demonstrating respect, gratitude, and a willingness to behave better?

Louis Brandeis, of course, would have seen things differently.  The author of “Other People’s Money: And How The Bankers Use It,” was under no illusions concerning the underlying financial power structures and how they operated.  He would have regarded an appeal to the better nature of bankers as somewhere between humorous and sad.

The only thing that will make a different is regulation.  This is the lesson of the 1930s in the US – the regulations imposed at that time created a financial sector that did not impede growth after World War II; basic intermediation (connecting savers and borrowers) worked fine and destabilizing frenzies were avoided.  During this period, the financial sector came up with venture capital, ATMs, and credit cards – arguably the three most important financial innovations of the past 100 years, and much more helpful of real innovation than anything you’ve seen since 1980.

President Obama claimed that three regulatory proposals will make the system safer.

“First, we’re proposing new rules to protect consumers and a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency to enforce those rules.”  This is a very good thing, and of course the banks are adamantly opposed.  But this Agency will not by itself bring us financial stability; that requires change at the level of how banks and other financial institutions are operated.

Second, he talked about “gaps in regulation”; this is international finance bureaucrat code for mush (doesn’t the President know this?).  The specific potentially interesting pieces he put under this heading were run together in this paragraph,

“While holding the Federal Reserve fully accountable for regulation of the largest, most interconnected firms, we’ll create an oversight council to bring together regulators from across markets to share information, to identify gaps in regulation, and to tackle issues that don’t fit neatly into an organizational chart. We’ll also require these financial firms to meet stronger capital and liquidity requirements and observe greater constraints on their risky behavior. That’s one of the lessons of the past year. The only way to avoid a crisis of this magnitude is to ensure that large firms can’t take risks that threaten our entire financial system, and to make sure they have the resources to weather even the worst of economic storms.”

Making the Fed responsible for the largest firms could work, but only if the Fed throws out pretty much everything about the Greenspan doctrine of cleaning up after financial messes, rather than preventing them.  There is no indication they are moving in this direction.

The oversight council is unlikely to make a difference.  If you ask someone, “Who is responsible for this problem?” and they answer, “Well, we have a committee,” does that make you feel better or worse?

The administration will not tell anyone the exact capital and liquidity requirements they are proposing, but close observers of the internal administration process have taken to calling the likely increases “dinky”.  Remember, the last time our financial system showed this taste for risk and a comparable level of incompetence (prior to 1935), it had equity relative to assets roughly three times current levels (e.g., put into tier one-equivalent terms).  There is no proposal on the table, either in the US or within the G20, that is even remotely in the right ballpark.  President Obama has put his finger on the problem but is apparently unwilling to do anything about it.

The most remarkable phrasing is probably, “Even as we’ve proposed safeguards to make the failure of large and interconnected firms less likely, we’ve also proposed creating what’s called “resolution authority” in the event that such a failure happens and poses a threat to the stability of the financial system. This is intended to put an end to the idea that some firms are “too big to fail.””

It is very hard to understand how the administration can say this with a straight face.  Certainly a resolution authority would help, but all bank interventions are negotiated receiverships or conservatorships of some kind.  When banks are failing, they need a lot of money fast and you have them over a barrel.  But if they are vast, complex, and – remember this – cross-border, then taking them over or shutting them down can be scary, whether or not you have a “legal authority”.  Please point out to me (a) what the US is pushing the G20 to implement in terms of a cross-border resolution authority, and (b) how you would intervene in a bank like Citi without a cross-border authority.  This rhetoric around this issue is completely not serious – in fact, it’s a distraction from the real issues.

And, of course, the real issues were not mentioned at all.

1)      The largest financial institutions have to be made smaller  — aim to make them under $100bn in assets, roughly the size of CIT Group which even this Treasury was willing to leave to its own devices.  We can do it with legislation now or by regulatory fiat next time the behemoths get into trouble, but we should do it before they ruin us.

2)      The people who run banks like to talk about “skin in the game” in various contexts, but they generally have only a small proportion of their wealth at risk in these financial institutions.  This is not a panacea of course, but it is completely fair to ask them to stake a large part of their fortunes.  If they respond that this is not fair because all kinds of things can happen that are beyond their control, you should say, “Agreed – so split your bank up and manage something much smaller.”

3)      The revolving door between Wall Street and Washington is out of control.  There is no way people should be able to go directly (or even overnight) from a failing bank to designing bailout packages to benefit such banks.  In any other industry, in any other country, and at any other time in American history, this would have been seen as an unconscionable conflict of interest.  Let’s get our principles back and impose a 5 year moratorium on such flows in either direction.

4)      The way the Fed operates means that, in the absence of tough regulation, the finance industry has at its disposal the world’s greatest ever bailout machine.  Our financial elite knows this and is acting accordingly.

Brandeis was scathing about the individuals behind the financial structures.  For him, it was about power and it was about control.  He was appalled by how big finance operated and he worked hard – an uphill slog – to rein it in.

But Brandeis never saw anything like what we have now experienced, with regard to the amount of taxpayer money that the banks are able to expropriate when downside risks materialize.  The big banks that Brandeis feared did not, in the end, dominate the 20th century.  But they are back now, with unfettered power and an arrogance that spells trouble.

Ultimately, we will put the banks back in their regulatory box or they will bankrupt us all.

By Simon Johnson

Written by Simon Johnson

137 Responses

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  1.  

    Ultimately will get put off until it happens, probably after 2012.

    robby

    September 15, 2009 at 7:01 am

     

  2.  

    In some of the commentary on NPR after Obama’s speech, one of the reporters said something to this effect: “Yes, but if the U.S. puts into effect very tight standards and controls on banks, then other banks in other nations will be more than willing to step in and do what the U.S. banks could no longer do.” Therefore, I agree with the need for cross-border rules and regulations. And … I also share your skepticism that the U.S. will seriously promote true cross-border crack downs. I am reminded that U.S. weapons sales have soared in recent years, and when folks try to put a stop to all our arms selling abroad, the response back usually is, “If we get out of the arms export business, some other country will just get right in.” Either way — in international financial regulation or in true arms control — we seem to be fated to continue bad behavior because “If we don’t do it, someone else will.” It seems to be a never-ending spiral down!

    Bruce P.

    September 15, 2009 at 7:14 am

     

    •  

      …other banks in other nations will be more than willing to step in and do what the U.S. banks could no longer do.

      And, those other nations will have to come up with ways of bailing them out when they do it.

      Yakkis

      September 15, 2009 at 12:07 pm

       

      •  

        Exactly – let someone else bail them out, and good riddance.

        redleg

        September 15, 2009 at 1:18 pm

         

    •  

      I find this argument silly: “other banks in other nations will be more than willing to step in and do what the U.S. banks could no longer do”. We have the reserve currency, no other currency is ready to step into the breach — so no other country has access to the bailout resources that we have. (The Euro countries have far too many coordination problems to be relied on in a bailout.)

      In short, the only reliable source of bailout money is the US. Where we go others will follow. End of story.

      Anon1234

      September 15, 2009 at 1:16 pm

       

  3.  

    The parasite knows better than to kill the host; the parasite knows just how far to go without killing the host.

    Yakkis

    September 15, 2009 at 7:21 am

     

    •  

      Your point is well taken, but I think the parasite is close to killing the host. The CEO’s that did not attend are the very ones who ended up in La Place de la Concord. Perhaps these CEO’s don’t read history, a point you’ve made before.

      whess

      September 15, 2009 at 8:45 am

       

    •  

      Ever seen an animal killed by an infestation of parasites. It isn’t pretty and it does happen.

      robby

      September 15, 2009 at 9:55 am

       

    •  

      The parasite *used to* know just how far to go.

      Uncle Billy Cunctator

      September 15, 2009 at 2:26 pm

       

    •  

      VERY bad metaphore. Tell that false reassurance to the millions who die every year of malaria.

      That plasmodium must have missjudged how far it could go without killing the host.

      Still want a parasitic banker???

      delaware

      September 15, 2009 at 10:39 pm

       

  4.  

    I honestly don’t think that ATMs and credit cards played a huge role in helping society prosper. Big conveniences, yes, but you paid for that ten times over.

    Yakkis

    September 15, 2009 at 7:28 am

     

    •  

      But they have been part of the problem. They have allowed much of the “middle class” (whatever that means) live beyond their incomes. They have helped the bank prosper because a cardholder is gouged everytime they are late with a payment or over draw their account.

      whess

      September 15, 2009 at 8:48 am

       

    •  

      Why is the ATM a “financial innovation”? A customer service and IT innovation, absolutely, but it doesn’t do anything a bank teller couldn’t do before it.

      Mitch

      September 15, 2009 at 10:39 am

       

      •  

        But you no longer need a bank teller, or the bank to even be open to access your account. Think of having to actually go INSIDE the bank and wait for a teller to get cash, deposit a paycheck, etc.
        Ya dig?

        redleg

        September 15, 2009 at 1:22 pm

         

        •  

          Well, I’m old enough to remember what it was like to have to go inside a bank to conduct routine transactions. It was inconvenient, to be sure.

          But I still have trouble seeing the introduction of ATMs and direct deposit of paychecks as anything more than conveniences, and describing them as “financial innovations” seems like quite a stretch to me.

          john

          September 15, 2009 at 2:29 pm

           

          •  

            Could be that the people who proffered “ATM” as an innovation were being tongue in cheek. Might need to check the video, but if they were smirking when they said it, they were probably referring to the innovation of turning real estate into ATM’s.

            Uncle Billy Cunctator

            September 16, 2009 at 12:27 am

             

          •  

            Not trying to be hyperbolic here, but there was a time when the automobile was a convenience. For all but those who live near realistic urban transit systems, it is a plain necessity.

            I think of credit in the same way.

            ACooper

            September 16, 2009 at 1:17 am

             

  5.  

    “The people who run banks like to talk about “skin in the game” in various contexts, but they generally have only a small proportion of their wealth at risk in these financial institutions. ”

    I read somewhere in the last 48 hours (but I can’t remember where) that Lehman’s folks *did* have substantial skin in the game, but that didn’t stop them from overlevering.

    Robert Bell

    September 15, 2009 at 7:33 am

     

  6.  

    Here in Germany the weekly Spiegel runs a story about the speech with the headline “Helpless against the gamblers”. It ends with CNN asking a Wall Street pundit how Wall Street reacted to the speech. Her answer: “With a collective yawning”. That sums up the state of affairs pretty well.

    Stephan

    September 15, 2009 at 7:51 am

     

  7.  

    “If we don’t do it, someone else will.”

    to me it seems the international stuff we have is good as meeting ground for people to either synchronize action considered to be beneficial as well as to collude for the latest fad – but once somebody decides to break any of those rules there seem to be no effective repercussions.

    maybe we should have public fights between finance wizards where the one who wins gets a Roman style triumph and all the money he/she wants who can explain the most complicated stuff in just one sentence
    - I know that’s a frivolous idea and will not find support because it would cost also the jobs of so many decent experts whose livelihood is to explain to us the evil machinations of the indecent experts.

    Another method would be to tell the public that it is NOT shameful or a sign of lack of education or intelligence if one insists on checking things up with just paper and pencil.

    Silke

    September 15, 2009 at 8:25 am

     

    •  

      “If we don’t do it, someone else will” is also the argument Greenspan used for preventing derivatives regulation. The someone else was England (other countries had the good sense not to go buck wild), and we all know how that turned out.

      Yakkis

      September 15, 2009 at 12:20 pm

       

  8.  

    President Obama still remains sadly dependent on Robert Rubin, and of course Rubin’s to proteges, Larry Summers and Tim Geithner. This is probably the tragic flaw of his administration. Ironically, perhaps because Franklin Roosevelt knew Wall Street so well, through his family, friends, politics, and occasional practice as Wall Street lawyer, he never felt in awe of it or intimidated by it. There is also a question of timing in that Obama in a sense has becomee President in the equivalent of 1930-31, not at after the winter of 1932-33 when the whole economy seem about to come to an end as described in Schlesginer’s “The Crisis of the Old Order.” Roosevelt really did have much more freedom of action in 1933-35 then Obama does now (for one thing, the Conservative Southern Democrats were stil in Roosevelt’s big tent and only really moved into opposition against Roosevelt with the court-packing fight of 1937 (and Roosevelt had weakened himself when his Fiscal restraint helping to trigger the 1936-37 recession) while today they are the core of the Republican Party reprsenting the White South in total opposition to anything Obama might try). Ironically, Obama’s, Geithner’s, and Bernanke success, so far, in preventing Great Depression 2.0 is making the political fight for reform more difficult. And if the Supreme Court rules that anything restraint on Corporate spending for political activity as unconstitutional, the country will be completely a financial oligarchy since any politician for Federal office who steps on the interests of a major corporation or bank would face hundreds of millions of dollars being used to defeat him or her for election while if the propery serve tha interest, they would receive like amounts to sustain them in office forever.

    Rickstersherpa

    September 15, 2009 at 8:35 am

     

    •  

      Further to Rickstersherpa:

      The US has always been a nation of the oligarchs, by the oligarchs, for the oligarchs- for better and worse.

      Now, as expected, the Supreme Court (slim majority) as a matter of its (oligarchist) “false consciousness” inclination, will rule for Corporate/Labor Union unrestricted fundings of political campaigns, ostensibly to uphold the right of free speech (as much as I wonder if they would uphold Hitler’s right, then)

      The issue at hand, though, for The Supreme Court to consider, simply, is this- POWER DIFFERENTIAL.

      If the COURT does not rule accordingly OLIGARCHS win-FOREVER. One can, then, hope for benign oligarchs. Good Luck.

      YMR

      September 17, 2009 at 10:31 pm

       

  9.  

    There is an historical parallel to the way the bankers and industrialists saw Hitler in 1933 and the way Wall Street is reacting to Obama. I suggest nothing ill about President Obama. He is a genuinely good man, but he just doesn’t get how perilous the situtation is. But what happens in the next election cycle if there is no noticeable improvement in the state of the economy, job creation, and wealth distribution? The obstructionist politics of the right have a rational goal.

    whess

    September 15, 2009 at 8:55 am

     

    •  

      The situation is genuinely much more worrisome than in 1933. Then there was a crisis mostly in the minds of a number of right wing fascists, racists, exploiters, vengeful minded nationalist individuals, rabid left wing Leninist type fascists, etc. In other words, the crisis was mostly psychological, and man made. Without counting the Great Depression crisis, a recent sharp downswing.

      Now the downswing is not recent, but well installed on what seems to be a secular basis: the West’s intellectual, scientific edges and economic advantage are fading, while the energy and climate crises are falling as walls on us. Many sorts of environments are starting to crash down, and many of the ways out being tried presently will only make the situation worse.

      And i do not have to mention WMDs, which were not tried in WWII (but for the sharp nuclear conclusion).

      http://patriceayme.wordpress.com

      Patrice Ayme

      September 15, 2009 at 11:29 am

       

    •  

      whess: “There is an historical parallel to the way the bankers and industrialists saw Hitler in 1933 and the way Wall Street is reacting to Obama.”

      Then there is hope that Obama will prevail! ;)

      Min

      September 15, 2009 at 1:34 pm

       

      •  

        Many bankers and industrialists, in Germany and USA loved Hitler in 1933. Actually they had financed him hard for nearly 13 years.

        Anyway, Min: did Hitler prevail then?

        Patrice Ayme

        September 16, 2009 at 9:53 am

         

        •  

          One of his main financiers was Prescott Bush, father of George and grandfather of George W.

          Yakkis

          September 16, 2009 at 11:29 am

           

        •  

          Patrice Ayme: “Anyway, Min: did Hitler prevail then?”

          Hey! 924 more years! 924 more years!

          ;)

          Min

          September 16, 2009 at 3:14 pm

           

  10.  

    What if we match private sector financial innovation (”innovation”?) with a little of the same from the public sector, a la massive government spending? Marshall Auerback is pushing that, and by the end of his argument, I’m convinced. Big government spending certainly says more, more powerfully, than anything Obama is willing to these days.

    anne

    September 15, 2009 at 9:11 am

     

    •  

      The conservative side of me dislikes this ever growing debt, especially since we are funded by foreign sources. That seems to have been one of the underlying problems in the crisis. Because our debt was being bought off shore and not competing domestic sources of credit, it did not drive up our interest rates as it should have, which would have cooled the economy and limited the bubble.

      whess

      September 15, 2009 at 9:44 am

       

      •  

        If the government is going to spend anything, it should be for the benefit of the Nation as a whole, and not for the financial elite.
        Bailing out corporations doesn’t benefit the nation. Spending money to allow the bad actors to fail (without collapsing the system as a whole) due to their own actions (or lack of them) would be IMO acceptable. The bailouts have proceeded on the concept that the TBTF banks and the system are the same thing. Let them go and let the next generation of TBTF banks germinate – my grandkids can deal with them in 65 years.

        redleg

        September 15, 2009 at 1:35 pm

         

      •  

        whess: “The conservative side of me dislikes this ever growing debt”

        Then you are not one of those modern conservatives, who purposely saddled the government with debt, to cripple it. They succeeded only too well.

        Min

        September 15, 2009 at 1:38 pm

         

        •  

          Min, according to conservatives there are two types of debt: good debt and bad debt.

          Good debt is the debt used to bomb other countries, buy weapons, give corporate welfare, and put people in prison.

          Bad debt is any money spent on education, health, social services, scientific research or pensions.

          Yakkis

          September 15, 2009 at 1:43 pm

           

          •  

            Yakkis: “Good debt is the debt used to bomb other countries,”

            They pay tribute, right? Just like Iraq has paid for our invasion and occupation.

            “buy weapons,”

            Weapons are cool! Have you seen the one in Heston’s cold, dead hand?

            “give corporate welfare,”

            They give it back. Trickle down. Just like we have seen for the last 25 years.

            “and put people in prison.”

            Where else do we get slave labor these days?

            You are right. These kinds of debt pay for themselves. ;)

            Min

            September 16, 2009 at 3:20 pm

             

          •  

            you have a one sided view on tribute
            Empires pay tribute also, these days it is called foreign aid
            in the old old old days empires paid it to be left undisturbed
            (btw I never knew that until it revealed itself to me last winter – maybe they do not tell us that the Romans did it because they want us not to know it because it would make foreign aid look less saintly)

            Silke

            September 16, 2009 at 3:31 pm

             

          •  

            Of course Simon is the expert on this, but I always thought foreign aid was used to foment armed conflict or give countries loans that would bankrupt them so that U.S. could sieze their natural resources.

            Yakkis

            September 17, 2009 at 11:46 am

             

          •  

            Yakkis
            once more:
            in the old old old days when foreign aid was still called tribute it was of course up to the so aided state to use the money to fight with his neighbours on its other side – or take the case of the Bulgarians when they would get uppity with Byzantium then the Hungarians might get a little subsidy encouraging them to keep Bulgarians busy with defending their northern border and of course a month later the incentives might be placed quite differently.
            The most recent time I have read an extensive description of is WW1 and at the end of it your president Wilson was aghast (according to Churchill) at the terrible dealings between allies we Europeans find normal. Thus when I talk of the use of foreign aid for power politics I am talking exclusively of the old world using them that way.

            Silke

            September 17, 2009 at 1:04 pm

             

  11.  

    More than anything, limiting the absolute size of these institutions is imperitive.

    whess

    September 15, 2009 at 9:45 am

     

    •  

      Totally agree!!!

      Wendy

      September 18, 2009 at 11:41 am

       

  12.  

    Brilliant!

    Now we need to boil this all down to a rallying cry that everyone can understand, that can be put on placards, spray-painted on walls, and used to confront every politician and candidate in the land.

    What do we want?

    BUBB– Break Up Big Banks

    When do we want it?

    Yesterday (but we’ll settle for Now)

    If you are willing to break up the banks, you are with us. If not, you are against us, and against democracy, capitalism, Mom and apple pie.

    BUBB

    Pass it along.

    Kelli

    September 15, 2009 at 10:02 am

     

    •  

      Against apple pie??!!
      Now I am truly irritated. Let’s get these anti-apple pie cruds.

      1. Come monday each TBTF bank ansd bailed out entity (eg AIG)is to divided across three shell banks/entities.

      2. Brandweis type rules pomulgated and executives breaching same risk prison term without the option.

      3. A global reserve facility created with units valued on a basket of products. Basket revaluation done each year or 3 years.

      4. All existing national debts (prior to reserve facility create date)to remain with each country. Pending optional transfer arrangements (no magic copouts)

      5. All global trade to be valued at reserve units only. Other contracts unenforceable. Eliminate exchange ripoffs.

      6. Mr.President we can start October 1st!

      Can I find any supporters to polish this? The whole project to be run by non-bankers.

      notabanker

      September 15, 2009 at 11:13 pm

       

      •  

        ” A global reserve facility”

        I am all for a try but is it not only noble but also possible?
        what is the true success record of international let alone global facilities to date?

        no matter how savvy the founding rules and regulations will be you will have to live with the world/basic conditions changing faster or rather more fundamentally than the facility can adjust or the original writers of the charta could foresee. Then either the facility adjusts by adjusting the rules when in reality it should write totally new ones but no majority will be found for that etc etc … and after a pretty short time arteriosclerosis will have set in

        Silke

        September 16, 2009 at 5:17 am

         

  13.  

    Is it possible to have free trade all around the world and at the same time shield some aspect of your economy from the trading partners?
    I guess that you have a choice, either you go for splendid isolation/autarchy or some such thing or you will have to fight unwelcome influences and competitions. The art, if you go for the latter, is to balance this nicely and in order to do that stop first of all spreading the idiocy that free trade is without its draw backs.

    Silke

    September 15, 2009 at 10:07 am

     

    •  

      I saw an interview w/ Taleb in May (approx) where he said (paraphrasing) “We can have global trade or debt, but not both.”

      redleg

      September 15, 2009 at 1:38 pm

       

    •  

      Could thjis be possible? Is China still achieving this shielding with their twin currencies? There was an internal domestic currency and the external currency. Exchange control was rigid. Maybe this has gone away?

      Re world trade, someone suggested that to employ the continuing Chinese migration of workers from farm to factories will exceed total current installed European and US manufacturing employment! Does our employment displacement and outsourcing have a point of equilibrium? If so how is it defined?

      Is the only ‘fix’ government ownership as per GM?

      notabanker

      September 15, 2009 at 11:25 pm

       

      •  

        if I feel in worrying mood I imagine what happens when Chinese labour upgrades to machines or yet to be invented machines, increases productivity, creates unemployables?

        “Is the only ‘fix’ government ownership as per GM?”

        in a way that’s probably what we are already doing …

        If I look out of my window I seem to be seeing a lot of unemployed and unemployables – how many there are is hard to find out, there are so many “training” programs out there that result in the figures kept low not least by giving the trainers something to do – but if I go downtown and see all the young people during the day time sporting hair styles no employer would tolerate I can’t believe they are all making a living waiting tables in night clubs – and to be just all the “middle” people are obviously recovering from some abusive use of something – of course this area is kind of the poor house of Germany but still the extent is frightening.

        Silke

        September 16, 2009 at 5:29 am

         

        •  

          Sobering stuff my friend. Over here I guess we think of Germany as being in pretty good shape. Where are you in Germany? I feel I should have been more informed/concerned but CNN has not given this picture.

          I trust things are on the improve?

          notabanker

          September 16, 2009 at 7:23 am

           

          •  

            “I trust things are on the improve?”

            if the industry manages to make enough money with very little highly qualified personnel the public coffers may be able to support it all for quite a while longer – as to our industry one pundit called it some years ago a bazaar industry meaning that we buy lots and lots of stuff abroad and then just assemble it here to be able to stamp it “made in Germany”

            but don’t listen to me – I am a gloomist and a hedonist, so I have moved for retirement to one of the most beautiful areas of my beautiful country which seems to see its best chances for its economy in building assisted living homes for the elderly – besides tourism of course but with a very short high season (thanks to the crisis? this summer seems to have been pretty good) – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostholstein

            Silke

            September 16, 2009 at 7:41 am

             

  14.  

    I am as weary of reading brilliant commentators who can articulate the weaknesses and dangers in our system as I am of Obama who can read a teleprompter even better that George Bush could. Listening to that Obama nonsense is like listening to Maddoff pitch his fund. Wow! That sounds great…. ummm, except it is meaningless and disappears like smoke as fast as it leaves his mouth.

    Everything could be different if an outsider was the Director of the N.E.C. instead of this manipulative Lawrence Summers. And Obama’s selection is unforgivable.
    ___
    The National Economic Council is composed of numerous department and agency heads within the administration, whose policy jurisdictions impact the nation’s economy. The NEC Director works in conjunction with these officials to coordinate and implement the President’s economic policy objectives. The Director is supported by a staff of policy specialists in various fields including: agriculture, commerce, energy, financial markets, fiscal policy, healthcare, labor, and Social Security.

    Larry Kudlow is Giddy

    September 15, 2009 at 10:20 am

     

    •  

      Can anyone seriously still believe that Obama could save us all–truly WANTS to (needs to!) save us all–but is surrounded by conniving viziers and subalterns who mislead him and betray the country??

      The man is the package. His subordinates serve at his will. It reminds me of the creepy cover from my college paperback edition of Hobbes, in which the king’s armor turns out to be composed of thousands of individuals who look just like him.

      The myth of the just but mislead sovereign is the oldest trope in the world. It is a Grimm Fairy tale. Give it up.

      Kelli

      September 15, 2009 at 10:41 am

       

      •  

        I like to think of it as his “good cop, bad cop” routine.

        Yakkis

        September 15, 2009 at 11:49 am

         

      •  

        >Can anyone seriously still believe that Obama could save us all–truly WANTS to (needs to!) save us all–but is surrounded by conniving viziers and subalterns who mislead him and betray the country??

        Well, talk about a strawman argument, eh? You ascribe a behavior and set of values to the man that has nothing to do with what he is trying to achieve.

        President Obama inherited this economy, already tanked, flat on its back, when he took office in January. Period.

        So, me, personally, I’ll give him more than 8.5 months to fix a 16.5 trillion economy that took a decade to break before I start talking about him as a problem. And frankly, he deals with a financial world still awash with money and power who is trying to block him whenever and whereever it can, and he is not free to do whatever his heart may want. But he knows that.

        Give it up?

        David

        David Goldstein

        September 15, 2009 at 12:06 pm

         

        •  

          You left out a key part of the story, namely the last 8 months where he appointed the unrepentent architects of the crisis to all key posts…with the expected results.

          Yakkis

          September 15, 2009 at 12:23 pm

           

          •  

            A very important piece.
            When will both parties realize that tapping populist anger is an easy victory strategy in the next few elections?
            I don’t think they will. This may be the right time for one of the 2 to fade away, and I’ll be shorting the GOP.

            redleg

            September 15, 2009 at 1:42 pm

             

        •  

          I don’t deny that he inherited a terrible hand. But that terrible hand could actually have served him well if he showed the least inclination to undo the damage of the last 30 years of deregulation. Have you seen any evidence that this is the path he plans to go down?

          It’s not a partisan fight. Left and right critics agree that the window for serious, root and branch reform is only open for a short time–it’s probably already too late. Somehow saving American capitalism and democracy (from its own worst excesses) was not at the top of Obama’s to-do list. Fill in your own reasons why, but the outcome is undeniable.

          Kelli

          September 15, 2009 at 1:48 pm

           

      •  

        Obama is a lawyer by training and economically-illiterate. There was an article in Newsweek in January or thereabouts that reported that Obama and his equally-clueless advisors were very happy when Larry Summers stopped by with his PowerPoint presentation and explained to them how the world financial system worked. Soon after, Summers got the NEC job. Terrifying, truly terrifying. Faced with the collapse of the world economy and impending Depression, the out-of-his-depth Obama listened to morons like Summers who said “we must save the banks that are Too Big To Fail or we will all fail”.

        Margaret

        September 19, 2009 at 2:02 pm

         

    •  

      Larry Kudlow is Giddy: “who can read a teleprompter even better that George Bush could”

      Isn’t it obvious that Bush did not have a teleprompter. Besides, he was not into reading that much, anyway. ;)

      Min

      September 15, 2009 at 1:41 pm

       

  15.  

    if you want to experience a “little” fright about the forces outside the US and their potential influences listen to this one http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00mgy5h
    at least the Chinese up to now have not fancied paralyzing the French capital for the duration of a visit like this guy did and after listening to the above of what he is all up to and in to, finding him as ridiculous, as he undoubtedly is, becomes increasingly hard
    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-501051/Five-planes-camel-tent-30-female-virgin-bodyguards–Libyan-leader-Gaddafi-arrives-Paris-entourage.html

    Silke

    September 15, 2009 at 10:57 am

     

    •  

      OK. So what? How does this relate to banking problems?

      Stephan

      September 15, 2009 at 11:26 am

       

      •  

        in my book the owners of commodities have cash and I still think that banking problems are related to money

        Silke

        September 15, 2009 at 11:41 am

         

        •  

          You’re correct: banking problems are related to money. And owners of commodities have cash. So have a lot of other people. But do these people (i.e. Gaddafi) pose systemic risk to the world economy? I don’t think so.

          Stephan

          September 15, 2009 at 11:55 am

           

          •  

            who or what is it then posing systemic risk to the world economy?

            Silke

            September 15, 2009 at 12:20 pm

             

          •  

            The biggest single systemic risk, as I have argued for years, are the bank regulators trying to live out the bedroom dream of a world with no bank defaults, while the best way to reduce systemic risk in the banking sector, is to see that they are swiftly put out of business when they can´t make it, and of course making sure they never grow so big it hurts too much when they fall on you.

            Per Kurowski

            September 15, 2009 at 12:33 pm

             

          •  

            “Systemic risk” seems like a very muddy term. Define it for me, or show me a formula for how to compute it. I’m not even sure what it’s referring to.

            Is it risk taken on by everyone in the banking system by lending badly? Risk of universal bank runs? Bank runs on specific big banks? I don’t know.

            Yakkis

            September 15, 2009 at 12:34 pm

             

          •  

            Yakis writes: “Systemic risk” seems like a very muddy term.

            You are right and it is getting murkier day by day.

            As I interpreted it used to be a risk of something that the system could not self correct and that could make the system spin out of control. When I wrote about it 2002-2004 I referred primarily to the risk of empowering the credit rating agencies too much so that too many would follow some ratings that we knew that sooner or later would be wrong since sooner or later the credit rating agencies would be captured.

            Then nowadays many refer to systemic risk as the risk that some banks have grown too large for a system that is not prepared to digest the failure of it.

            Lately I have been arguing that the largest systemic risk is the introduction of a regulatory risk-adverseness that could have far reaching implications for the whole world system… as there is absolutely nothing out there to tell humanity that what it should concentrate on is keeping the banks stable.

            Per Kurowski

            September 15, 2009 at 12:45 pm

             

          •  

            and if I take the spinning top image of StatsGuy,does the knob where it contacts the earth stand for the actual money inflated further up by leverage and the energy that makes it spin are the regulations?

            Silke

            September 15, 2009 at 12:49 pm

             

  16.  

    Definitely Simon Johnson’s background in the IMF weighs heavily on him and he is just like all the other regulators, more concerned with the stability of the banks than with the purpose of the banks.

    Since 2004 we are living with bank regulations which came out of Basel and that orders lower capital requirements for operations perceived as having a low chance of default and high capital requirements for operations perceived as having higher risks of default. This effectively channels the funds of our financial system towards anything perceived as low risked without the slightest consideration to whether this serves any purpose or not.

    I thought that Simon Johnson was younger but no, it seems he has already joined the baby-boomer’s in their risk adverseness, only looking for a place to lie down and die.

    Or could it be that he is so ideologically enamored with the concept that with these Basel regulations the banks can lend to the government with zero capital requirements… as if a government running amok in spending represents no risk… as if a government does not represent a counter-party risk.

    Problem with regulators like Simon Johnson is that they cannot get into their heads that even if the credit rating agencies had been totally right and there had been no losses in the quite useless financing of a housing boom in the US, the regulatory system would still be wrong since the world needs to take risks in order to move forward.

    Problem with regulators like Simon Johnson is that they are always more concerned with avoiding the defaults of banks than avoiding the default of the world.

    This does not mean that Simon Johnson’s real issues are not important too, only that, in the great scheme of things, they are of a secondary importance and that, when you design regulations, it is always better to start thinking on what you want to achieve than on what you want to avoid.

    Per Kurowski

    September 15, 2009 at 11:36 am

     

    •  

      Hi Per – glad to read you again
      one slightly off the topic question:

      do you have any idea why Basel became the city of Basel?
      Could it have anything to do with the anthroposophic community? Do not laugh at me, Berthold Beitz (Krupp) was one and a club with such a powerful member certainly does not have only one of that caliber.

      Silke

      September 15, 2009 at 11:48 am

       

      •  

        I would not even try to advance an answer on that but “maintaining that by correct training and personal discipline one can attain experience of the spiritual world” has little to do with the bank regulators I have met in my life.
        cheers

        Per Kurowski

        September 15, 2009 at 11:53 am

         

        •  

          well, your explanation of the 62,5 Basel II scenario definitely seems to indicate the existence of a highly spiritualized if not spirit-soaked world view

          Silke

          September 15, 2009 at 1:06 pm

           

    •  

      This is part of a general trend towards preserving institutions while forgetting what those institutions were supposed to do.

      Yakkis

      September 15, 2009 at 11:56 am

       

    •  

      If you think the world’s economy has ground down first gear (stripping the gears in the process!) because not enough risk was taken………..there is no rational argument to address your ideas.

      KFritz

      September 15, 2009 at 12:35 pm

       

      •  

        Per has explained this so many times, but if you are new to the blog, you might have missed it:

        People thought they were being risk averse in buying AAA rated junk that was actually very risky.

        If they had taken the effort to take real risks as bankers should and must, they would have been more circumspect about the risk and the payoff would have been more socially useful if the loan was successful.

        Yakkis

        September 15, 2009 at 12:48 pm

         

      •  

        That is exactly what I think. When the regulators informed the world that through the credit rating agencies they could access risk-free areas and stimulated the banks to finance those sectors by means of very low capital requirements, the regulators helped to channel the funds were they should not have gone so massively.

        We are in this mess not because some investors with very high risk appetite enter risky ventures like constructing railroads in Argentina, but because many highly risk-adverse investors thought they could make a couple of more basis points in returns by investing in safe assets, mortgages, in the safest country, the US and in the safest instruments the AAA rated.

        The losses in triple-A rated investments surpass by far the losses sustain in those areas perceived as much more riskier

        Per Kurowski

        September 15, 2009 at 12:55 pm

         

        •  

          I am convinced that the current regulatory paradigm (the first pillar and basically the only pillar of Basel) and which is based on a vaguely defined perceived risk of default, is utterly wrong in that it; first messes around with the risk-allocation mechanism of the market which prices risk in interest spreads and has no way to evaluate what the arbitrary risk-weights imposed by the regulators really mean; and second and even more important, channels and pushes financial flows into economic areas based only on that these have a perceived low risk of default, and which basically has nothing to do with nothing… except defending the status-quo.

          I have made these comments on about 50 Baseline posts and they have never been acknowledged with the slightest comment from any of the authors of the Baseline blog. How come? Have they some conflicts of interests they have not disclosed?

          Per Kurowski

          September 15, 2009 at 1:41 pm

           

          •  

            No offense intended, but it is their blog so they aren’t obligated to.
            Keep asking and maybe someone will help you answer that one independently…

            redleg

            September 15, 2009 at 1:47 pm

             

          •  

            Per
            if that picture on your blog is you, you are past your twenties and you still have not accepted that looking at a problem from a definitely not-mainstream angle is acknowledged only when it comes from “certified” sources?

            Silke

            September 15, 2009 at 1:52 pm

             

          •  

            Redleg. I agree completely. They have no obligation whatsoever. I just expressed some curiosity!!!

            Per Kurowski

            September 15, 2009 at 1:59 pm

             

          •  

            Yes Silke, that photo is of me and I am way past my twenties and of course I know that as someone who has not even a PhD I cannot be a sufficiently certified source for fine persons to answer out of the box-statements that do not belong in their out of the box. That said why should I not keep on telling it as I know it is? Who knows one day perhaps these fine persons have to explain why they felt they were above this issue, since, at the end of the day, it is really not the person that is important, but the issue. (And by the way even when I was a bit more of a certified source, like an Executive Director of the World Bank, I could still not get one of these regulators to react)

            Per Kurowski

            September 15, 2009 at 2:10 pm

             

          •  

            Per
            don’t you dare to stop explaining your point of view …
            - that I have become a “believer” and that Yakkis can paraphrase you so well may not count as much as “real” recognition would but you gave me something solid that feels in unison with my experience of “normal” life and maybe that good deed will give you some points in the big book in heaven ;-)
            btw why some people are listened to and some are not tends to have little or nothing to do with their academic titles – in fact figuring out the criteria by which that works is one of life’s unsolved mysteries to me (and I am not talking about my tending to be abrasive self)

            Silke

            September 15, 2009 at 2:31 pm

            <

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

Debunking the “Too Big To Fail” Myth

via ritholtz.com

Washington’s Blog strives to provide real-time, well-researched and actionable information. George – the head writer at Washington’s Blog – is a busy professional and a former adjunct professor.

~~~

As MIT economics professor and former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson points out today, the official White House position is that:

(1) The government created the mega-giants, and they are not the product of free market competition;

(2) The White House needs to “regulate and oversee them”, even though it is clear that the government has no real plans to regulate or oversee the banking behemoths;

(3) Giant banks are good for the economy

In response to the latest claims by the government, let me recap the real reason the government doesn’t want to break up the too big to fails.

We Need Them To Help the Economy Recover?

Do we need the Too Big to Fails to help the economy recover?

No.

The following top economists and financial experts believe that the economy cannot recover unless the big, insolvent banks are broken up in an orderly fashion:

  • Dean and professor of finance and economics at Columbia Business School, and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, R. Glenn Hubbard
  • The leading monetary economist and co-author with Milton Friedman of the leading treatise on the Great Depression, Anna Schwartz
  • Economics professor and senior regulator during the S & L crisis, William K. Black
  • Professor of entrepreneurship and finance at the Chicago Booth School of Business, Luigi Zingales

Others, like Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman, think that the giant insolvent banks may need to be temporarily nationalized.

In addition, many top economists and financial experts, including Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer – who was Ben Bernanke’s thesis adviser at MIT – say that – at the very least – the size of the financial giants should be limited.

Even the Bank of International Settlements – the “Central Banks’ Central Bank” – has slammed too big to fail. As summarized by the Financial Times:

The report was particularly scathing in its assessment of governments’ attempts to clean up their banks. “The reluctance of officials to quickly clean up the banks, many of which are now owned in large part by governments, may well delay recovery,” it said, adding that government interventions had ingrained the belief that some banks were too big or too interconnected to fail.

This was dangerous because it reinforced the risks of moral hazard which might lead to an even bigger financial crisis in future.

If We Break ‘Em Up, No One Will Lend?

Do we need to keep the TBTFs to make sure that loans are made?

Nope.

Fortune pointed out in February that smaller banks are stepping in to fill the lending void left by the giant banks’ current hesitancy to make loans. Indeed, the article points out that the only reason that smaller banks haven’t been able to expand and thrive is that the too-big-to-fails have decreased competition:

Growth for the nation’s smaller banks represents a reversal of trends from the last twenty years, when the biggest banks got much bigger and many of the smallest players were gobbled up or driven under…

As big banks struggle to find a way forward and rising loan losses threaten to punish poorly run banks of all sizes, smaller but well capitalized institutions have a long-awaited chance to expand.

BusinessWeek noted in January:

As big banks struggle, community banks are stepping in to offer loans and lines of credit to small business owners…

At a congressional hearing on small business and the economic recovery earlier this month, economist Paul Merski, of the Independent Community Bankers of America, a Washington (D.C.) trade group, told lawmakers that community banks make 20% of all small-business loans, even though they represent only about 12% of all bank assets. Furthermore, he said that about 50% of all small-business loans under $100,000 are made by community banks…

Indeed, for the past two years, small-business lending among community banks has grown at a faster rate than from larger institutions, according to Aite Group, a Boston banking consultancy. “Community banks are quickly taking on more market share not only from the top five banks but from some of the regional banks,” says Christine Barry, Aite’s research director. “They are focusing more attention on small businesses than before. They are seeing revenue opportunities and deploying the right solutions in place to serve these customers.”

And Fed Governor Daniel K. Tarullo said in June:

The importance of traditional financial intermediation services, and hence of the smaller banks that typically specialize in providing those services, tends to increase during times of financial stress. Indeed, the crisis has highlighted the important continuing role of community banks…

For example, while the number of credit unions has declined by 42 percent since 1989, credit union deposits have more than quadrupled, and credit unions have increased their share of national deposits from 4.7 percent to 8.5 percent. In addition, some credit unions have shifted from the traditional membership based on a common interest to membership that encompasses anyone who lives or works within one or more local banking markets. In the last few years, some credit unions have also moved beyond their traditional focus on consumer services to provide services to small businesses, increasing the extent to which they compete with community banks.

Indeed, some very smart people say that the big banks aren’t really focusing as much on the lending business as smaller banks.

Specifically since Glass-Steagall was repealed in 1999, the giant banks have made much of their money in trading assets, securities, derivatives and other speculative bets, the banks’ own paper and securities, and in other money-making activities which have nothing to do with traditional depository functions.

Now that the economy has crashed, the big banks are making very few loans to consumers or small businesses because they still have trillions in bad derivatives gambling debts to pay off, and so they are only loaning to the biggest players and those who don’t really need credit in the first place. See this and this.

So we don’t really need these giant gamblers. We don’t really need JP Morgan, Citi, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. What we need are dedicated lenders.

The Fortune article discussed above points out that the banking giants are not necessarily more efficient than smaller banks:

The largest banks often don’t show the greatest efficiency. This now seems unsurprising given the deep problems that the biggest institutions have faced over the past year.

“They actually experience diseconomies of scale,” Narter wrote of the biggest banks. “There are so many large autonomous divisions of the bank that the complexity of connecting them overwhelms the advantage of size.”

And Governor Tarullo points out some of the benefits of small community banks over the giant banks:

Many community banks have thrived, in large part because their local presence and personal interactions give them an advantage in meeting the financial needs of many households, small businesses, and agricultural firms. Their business model is based on an important economic explanation of the role of financial intermediaries–to develop and apply expertise that allows a lender to make better judgments about the creditworthiness of potential borrowers than could be made by a potential lender with less information about the borrowers.

A small, but growing, body of research suggests that the financial services provided by large banks are less-than-perfect substitutes for those provided by community banks.

It is simply not true that we need the mega-banks. In fact, as many top economists and financial analysts have said, the “too big to fails” are actually stifling competition from smaller lenders and credit unions, and dragging the entire economy down into a black hole.

The Giant Banks Have Recovered, And Are No Longer Insolvent?

Have the TBTFs recovered, so that they are no longer insolvent?

Negatory.

The giant banks have still not put the toxic assets hidden in their SIVs back on their books.

The tsunamis of commercial real estate, Alt-A, option arm and other loan defaults have not yet hit.

The overhang of derivatives is still looming out there, and still dwarfs the size of the rest of the global economy. Credit default swaps have arguably still not been tamed (see this).

Indeed, Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said recently:

The U.S. has failed to fix the underlying problems of its banking system after the credit crunch and the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

“In the U.S. and many other countries, the too-big-to-fail banks have become even bigger,” Stiglitz said in an interview today in Paris. “The problems are worse than they were in 2007 before the crisis.”

Stiglitz’s views echo those of former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who has advised President Barack Obama’s administration to curtail the size of banks, and Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer, who suggested last month that governments may want to discourage financial institutions from growing “excessively.”

While the big boys have certainly reported some impressive profits in the last couple of months, some or all of those profits may have been due to “creative accounting”, such as Goldman “skipping” December 2008, suspension of mark-to-market (which may or may not be a good thing), and assistance from the government.

Some very smart people say that the big banks – even after many billions in bailouts and other government help – have still not repaired their balance sheets. Tyler Durden, Reggie Middleton, Mish and others have looked at the balance sheets of the big boys much more recently than I have, and have more details than I do.

But the bottom line is this: If the banks are no longer insolvent, they should prove it. If they can’t prove they are solvent, they should be broken up.

The Government Lacks the Power to Break Them Up?

Does the government lack the power to break up the TBTFs?

Wrong.

One of the world’s leading economic historians – Niall Ferguson – argues in a current article in Newsweek:

[Geithner is proposing that] there should be a new “resolution authority” for the swift closing down of big banks that fail. But such an authority already exists and was used when Continental Illinois failed in 1984.

Indeed, even the FDIC mentions Continental Illinois in the same breadth as “too big to fail” banks.

And William K. Black (remember, he was the senior regulator during the S&L crisis, and is a Professor of both Economics and Law) – says that the Prompt Corrective Action Law (PCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o, not only authorizes the government to seize insolvent banks, it mandates it, and that the Bush and Obama administrations broke the law by refusing to close insolvent banks.

Whether or not the banks’ holding companies can be broken up using the PCA, the banks themselves could be. See this.

And no one can doubt that the government could find a way to break up even the holdign companies if it wanted.

FDR seized gold during the Great Depression under the Trading With The Enemies Act.

Geithner and Bernanke have been using one loophole and “creative” legal interpretation after another to rationalize their various multi-trillion dollar programs in the face of opposition from the public and Congress (see this, for example).

And the government could use 100-year old antitrust laws to break them up.

So don’t give me any of this “our hands are tied” malarkey. The Obama administration could break the “too bigs” up in a heartbeat if it wanted to, and then justify it after the fact using PCA or another legal argument.

Is Temporarily Nationalizing the Giant Banks Socialism?

Many argue that it would be wrong for the government to break up the banks, because we would have to take over the banks in order to break them up.

That may be true. But government regulators in the U.S., Sweden and other countries which have broken up insolvent banks say that the government only has to take over banks for around 6 months before breaking them up.

In contrast, the Bush and Obama administrations’ actions mean that the government is becoming the majority shareholder in the financial giants more or less permanently. That is – truly – socialism.

Breaking them up and selling off the parts to the highest bidder efficiently and in an orderly fashion would get us back to a semblance of free market capitalism much quicker.

The Real Reason the Giant Banks Aren’t Being Broken Up

So what is the real reason that the TBTFs aren’t being broken up?

Certainly, there is regulatory capture, cowardice and corruption:

  • Joseph Stiglitz (the Nobel prize winning economist) said recently that the U.S. government is wary of challenging the financial industry because it is politically difficult, and that he hopes the Group of 20 leaders will cajole the U.S. into tougher action
  • Economic historian Niall Ferguson asks:

    Guess which institutions are among the biggest lobbyists and campaign-finance contributors? Surprise! None other than the TBTFs [too big to fails].

  • Manhattan Institute senior fellow Nicole Gelinas agrees:

    The too-big-to-fail financial industry has been good to elected officials and former elected officials of both parties over its 25-year life span

  • Investment analyst and financial writer Yves Smith says:

    Major financial players [have gained] control over the all-important over-the-counter debt markets…It is pretty hard to regulate someone who has a knife at your throat.

  • William K. Black says:

    There has been no honest examination of the crisis because it would embarrass C.E.O.s and politicians . . .
    Instead, the Treasury and the Fed are urging us not to examine the crisis and to believe that all will soon be well. There have been no prosecutions of the chief executives of the large nonprime lenders that would expose the “epidemic” of fraudulent mortgage lending that drove the crisis. There has been no accountability…

    The Obama administration and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke have refused to investigate the nature and causes of the crisis. And the administration selected Timothy Geithner, who with then Treasury Secretary Paulson bungled the bailout of A.I.G. and other favored “too big to fail” institutions, to head up Treasury.

    Now Lawrence Summers, head of the White House National Economic Council, and Mr. Geithner argue that no fundamental change in finance is needed. They want to recreate a secondary market in the subprime mortgages that caused trillions of dollars of losses.

    Traditional neo-classical economic theory, particularly “modern finance theory,” has been proven false but economists have failed to replace it. No fundamental reform can be passed when the proponents are pretending that there really is no crisis or need for change.

  • Harvard professor of government Jeffry A. Frieden says:

    Regulatory agencies are often sympathetic to the industries they regulate. This pattern is so well known among scholars that it has a name: “regulatory capture.” This effect can be due to the political influence of the industry on its regulators; or to the fact that the regulators spend so much time with their charges that they come to accept their world view; or to the prospect of lucrative private-sector jobs when regulators retire or resign.

  • Economic consultant Edward Harrison agrees:Regulating Wall Street has become difficult in large part because of regulatory capture.

But there is an even more interesting reason . . .

The number one reason the TBTF’s aren’t being broken up is [drumroll] . . . the ‘ole 80’s playbook is being used.

As the New York Times wrote in February:

In the 1980s, during the height of the Latin American debt crisis, the total risk to the nine money-center banks in New York was estimated at more than three times the capital of those banks. The regulators, analysts say, did not force the banks to value those loans at the fire-sale prices of the moment, helping to avert a disaster in the banking system.

In other words, the nine biggest banks were all insolvent in the 1980s.

Indeed, Richard C. Koo – former economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and doctoral fellow with the Fed’s Board of Governors, and now chief economist for Nomura – confirmed this fact last year in a speech to the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Specifically, Koo said that -after the Latin American crisis hit in 1982 – the New York Fed concluded that 7 out of 8 money center banks were actually “underwater” and “bankrupt”, but that the Fed hid that fact from the American people.

So the government’s failure to break up the insolvent giants – even though virtually all independent experts say that is the only way to save the economy, and even though there is no good reason not to break them up – is nothing new.

William K. Black’s statement that the government’s entire strategy now – as in the S&L crisis – is to cover up how bad things are (”the entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts”) makes a lot more sense.

 

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

Last Updated: October 14, 2009 00:00 EDT

via bloomberg.com

By Robert Schmidt

Oct. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Some of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s closest aides, none of whom faced Senate confirmation, earned millions of dollars a year working for Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Citigroup Inc. and other Wall Street firms, according to financial disclosure forms.

The advisers include Gene Sperling, who last year took in $887,727 from Goldman Sachs and $158,000 for speeches mostly to financial companies, including the firm run by accused Ponzi scheme mastermind R. Allen Stanford. Another top aide, Lee Sachs, reported more than $3 million in salary and partnership income from Mariner Investment Group, a New York hedge fund.

As part of Geithner’s kitchen cabinet, Sperling and Sachs wield influence behind the scenes at the Treasury Department, where they help oversee the $700 billion banking rescue and craft executive pay rules and the revamp of financial regulations. Yet they haven’t faced the public scrutiny given to Senate-confirmed appointees, nor are they compelled to testify in Congress to defend or explain the Treasury’s policies.

“These people are incredibly smart, they’re incredibly talented and they bring knowledge,” said Bill Brown, a visiting professor at Duke University School of Law and former managing director at Morgan Stanley. “The risk is they will further exacerbate the problem of our regulators identifying with Wall Street.”

While it isn’t unusual for Treasury officials to come from the financial industry, President Barack Obama has been critical of Wall Street, blaming its high-risk, high-pay culture for helping cause the financial-market meltdown.

‘Reckless Behavior’

Speaking to financial executives last month, Obama said: “We will not go back to the days of reckless behavior and unchecked excess that was at the heart of this crisis, where too many were motivated only by the appetite for quick kills and bloated bonuses.”

At the same time, the president has promised to change Washington by keeping lobbyists for special interests at a distance and by making decisions in the open.

Sperling and Sachs are each paid $162,900 at the Treasury. Along with four others, they hold the title of counselor to Geithner. Sachs, 46, withdrew earlier this year from consideration to be the Treasury’s top domestic finance official, a job that would have required Senate confirmation.

Geithner’s predecessor, Henry Paulson, brought on a coterie of non-confirmed advisers from Goldman Sachs at the end of his term. Paulson, who had been the firm’s chief executive officer, defended the arrangement as necessary to quickly bring in top talent when the financial system was on the verge of collapse.

Awaiting Confirmation

The title of counselor had been generally reserved for those awaiting confirmation. Some of Geithner’s aides now work in that capacity, including Lael Brainard, who has been nominated to be undersecretary for international affairs, and Jeffrey Goldstein, the nominee to be undersecretary for domestic finance.

“The use of counselors provides an opportunity to bring valuable expertise into the department to serve in a close capacity with the secretary,” said Rob Nichols, a former Treasury official under Secretaries Paul O’Neill and John Snow, neither of whom relied extensively on unconfirmed aides. “It’s important that they complement, but don’t supplant, the Senate confirmed appointments.”

The use of unconfirmed counselors can cut both ways. It allows Geithner to bring in staff quickly by avoiding the arduous confirmation process. On the other hand, the aides don’t get as tough a vetting by the White House or Congress and remain less accountable than Senate-confirmed officials.

Understanding Markets

Treasury spokesman Andrew Williams said the department needs people with a deep understanding of markets and the financial system, especially as it works to fend off the worst recession in half a century.

“The secretary thought that the best way to utilize their talents was to allow these individuals to provide advice to the secretary on policy issues through appointments as counselor,” Williams said.

All of Geithner’s counselors are subject to federal ethics rules, including a pledge to avoid contact with their former firms for at least a year, Williams added.

Most officials at the Treasury who have been approved by Congress come from academic, legal or non-Wall Street backgrounds. For example, Geithner’s deputy, Neal Wolin, was president and chief operating officer for property and casualty operations at insurer Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. in Hartford, Connecticut. Michael Barr, the assistant secretary for financial institutions, was a professor at the University of Michigan Law School.

Merrill Lynch Executive

An exception is Herb Allison, who runs the office that administers the financial rescue. He had been chief executive officer of mortgage finance company Fannie Mae and retirement- services firm TIAA-CREF, and before that was a longtime executive at Merrill Lynch & Co. in New York.

Along with Sperling and Sachs, Geithner’s inner circle also includes counselor Lewis Alexander, the former chief economist at Citigroup; Chief of Staff Mark Patterson, who was a lobbyist at Goldman Sachs, and Matthew Kabaker, a deputy assistant secretary who worked at private equity firm Blackstone Group LP. Patterson’s and Kabaker’s jobs did not require confirmation.

One counselor who doesn’t have a finance background is Jake Siewert, a press secretary for President Bill Clinton who came to the Treasury after working as a vice president at New York- based Alcoa Inc., the largest U.S. aluminum producer.

Alexander, who left Citigroup in March to join the Treasury, was paid $2.4 million in 2008 and the first few months of 2009, according to his financial-disclosure form. He advises Geithner on economic trends and does research on financial markets.

Toxic Assets

Kabaker, who works on domestic finance policy and helped craft the Treasury plan to spur banks to sell their toxic assets, earned $5.8 million working on private equity deals at Blackstone in 2008 and 2009 before joining the Treasury at the end of January, his disclosure form shows. Much of the compensation was in stock that Kabaker, who worked at Blackstone for 10 years, was awarded when it went public in 2007.

On his disclosure, Sachs estimated that he would receive $3.4 million in income from Mariner. The precise figure was not given because the books hadn’t closed on a number of partnerships when he joined the department in January. As of Feb. 23, when he signed the document, Sachs said he was also owed a 2008 bonus where the value was “not ascertainable.”

Sachs’s former firm also had agreed to repurchase his shares in Mariner Partners Inc., an investment fund. Sachs estimated his income from the fund at $1 million to $5 million. Sachs, who declined to comment, also specializes in domestic finance.

Work on Education

In Sperling’s primary job, he was paid $116,653 by the Council on Foreign Relations for work related to education in developing countries.

Sperling’s disclosure shows he supplemented his salary through a variety of consulting jobs, board seats, speaking fees and fellowships, to bring his total income to more than $2.2 million in the 13 months ending in January.

He was paid $480,051 as a director of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and $250,000 for providing quarterly economic briefings to two hedge fund firms, Brevan Howard Asset Management LLP and Sterling Stamos Capital Management.

Sperling spoke at a Washington event hosted by the Houston- based Stanford Group Co. in November 2008, three months before its chairman was sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission for allegedly bilking investors of $7 billion. He also spoke at a Washington event in October 2007 that was sponsored by Citigroup, which has received $45 billion in government assistance.

Paid Speeches

Sperling, 50, was paid for his speeches through the Harry Walker Agency, which books speakers. His disclosure form does not list how much he was paid for each speech.

Sperling also drew a $137,500 salary from Bloomberg News for writing a monthly column and appearing on television, according to his disclosure.

Goldman Sachs paid Sperling the $887,727 for advice on its charitable giving. That made the bank his highest-paying employer. Even Geithner’s chief of staff Patterson, who was a full-time lobbyist at the firm, did not make as much as Sperling did on a part-time basis. Patterson reported earning $637,492 from Goldman Sachs last year.

“My sole work for Goldman Sachs was as lead consultant on the creation, design, and initial implementation of ‘10,000 Women,’ their $100 million philanthropic effort to give business and leadership education to poor women around the world,” Sperling said.

His total income of $2.2 million was unusually high, Sperling added.

The Wall Street ties are troubling to some advocates for investors. “Where is the transparency this administration promised?” asked Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC. “You just wonder, who is representing middle Americans?”

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

 

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

via money.cnn.com 
First Published: October 2, 2009: 4:07 AM ET

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- Taxpayers stand to lose between $100 billion and $200 billion on TARP -- Treasury's $700 billion financial market bailout.

While that's nothing to sneeze at, many experts say that the Troubled Asset Relief Program helped rescue the economy from a second Great Depression.

But there are others who argue that the billions of dollars that taxpayers shelled out simply delayed an inevitable epic collapse of the financial sector.

A year ago, when the financial markets were in turmoil, the Bush administration and supporters in Congress said TARP would be used to buy banks' troubled assets, and would be an investment -- it could even turn a profit.

But TARP, which celebrates its first birthday on Oct. 3, has been used for many programs it was not initially intended for, like saving AIG, automakers and helping struggling homeowners.

_____________________________

Some quick math: Of the authorized $700 billion, the Treasury Dept. has needed to deploy only about $450 billion.

About half of that has gone to investments in hundreds of financial institutions in exchange for preferred shares. From these programs, the government has gotten $71 billion back through repayments and $12 billion back through warrants and dividends.

The other half of TARP has gone to much riskier emergency lending programs or other non-lending initiatives. A big chunk of that will filter back to the Treasury's coffers eventually. But a lot won't be returned.

  • Foreclosure help: Treasury said it will not get any money back from a foreclosure mitigation program called Making Home Affordable. Treasury has spent $22.3 billion so far and will eventually spend $50 billion on that program.

 

  • Automakers: Taxpayers have sent $83.5 billion to automakers, $2.1 billion of which has been returned. Of the $50 billion in loans to General Motors, all but $6.7 billion were converted into common stock, and Treasury estimated that about $23 billion of that will be subject to "much lower recoveries." Of the $15.2 billion that went to Chrysler, Treasury said $5.4 billion is highly unlikely to be recovered.

     

  • AIG: The troubled insurer has a $182 billion bailout available to it, $70 billion of which is available from TARP. So far, Treasury has lent $44 billion to AIG (AIG, Fortune 500), and economists are dubious about getting the whole thing back. The company has pledged to repay its TARP loan in three to five years, but the insurer has missed three dividend payments already and won't pay back most of its other loans.

     

  • Citigroup: Treasury converted its entire $20 billion emergency loan to Citigroup (C, Fortune 500) into common stock. Financial industry experts note that though Citi's stock is up 365% from its March low, Treasury didn't convert the stock into common shares until the end of July, missing the vast majority of that rally.

     

  • Other programs: Economists are also doubtful that companies like GMAC, Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500) and CIT (CIT, Fortune 500) will pay back all or any of their loans. GMAC failed the capital stress test from May, and many believe the government will convert its $13.5 billion loan into common shares. We have $45 billion on the line with Bank of America, which is still struggling to work through its Merrill Lynch deal. And CIT is nearing bankruptcy, which would put the return of its $2.3 billion loan in jeopardy.

And that's how financial experts calculated the $100 billion to $200 billion that Treasury is likely to lose.

_____________________________

Why it was worth it: "We were presented with the worst case scenario last September: the collapse of the financial markets," said Steven Adamske, spokesman for the House Committee on Financial Services. "For anyone worried about losing a dollar over this, let's talk about the trillions of dollars more that would have been lost on retirement savings and the many more jobs that would have been lost."

Others even argue that TARP's value cannot be calculated in dollar terms.

"There are portions of TARP we'll never see a monetary return from," said Lawrence Kaplan, former special counsel at the Office of Thrift Services who is now counsel in the financial institutions practice at Paul Hastings. "But we've seen a significant economic return that is greater than just dollars."

For some, the alternative was simply too risky to stand pat.

"People will never understand the enormity of the disruption that we never saw: No one would have had credit, no one could have accessed their savings," said Edward Gainor, a partner at Bingham McCutchen in Washington who represents funds dealing with distressed assets. "As a society, we shouldn't regret that some amount was invested in keeping the wheels on the cart."

_____________________________

Why it wasn't worth it: There are many financial sector experts who say that TARP was a mistake.

"If you get a very expensive treatment that saves your life, but you don't sort out the underlying problem, it may not come back for awhile, but it will come and get you again," said Simon Johnson, professor of global economics and management at MIT.

Johnson contends that the government had an opportunity with TARP to really fix what ailed the economy: Regulators could have thrown out failing corporations' management, ensured that bad banks are less politically powerful and reformed regulation to rid financial institutions of irresponsible practices. Though the Obama administration is pushing for regulatory reform now, Johnson said the solutions don't go far enough because there isn't the same political will to ensure that the events of last year won't happen again as there was during the crisis.

As a result, Johnson and others argue that it's a false dichotomy between the bailout that Treasury drafted up and epic failure of the economy.

"There are serious questions about how TARP was managed, because it became much more intrusive into the economy than it should have been," said James Gattuso, senior fellow of regulatory policy at the conservative-leaning Heritage Foundation. "The market was more resilient than many gave it credit for ... but instead we gave money to companies like AIG and automakers. We aren't going to see that money again."

_____________________________

Related Articles:

Ranking the rescues

 

The collapse of Lehman led to a deeper recession and a litany of government programs to try to end the pain. We rate just how bold and effective the plans have been so far.
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When Wall Street nearly collapsed
Would panic prevail? That was the question gripping the world in the days surrounding the fall of Lehman Brothers on Sept. 15, 2008. One year after that terrifying Monday, the people who struggled to cope with the financial crisis share what they were thinking as chaos broke out.

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

Article Bullets:

  • FHA - Federal Housing Administration - may need a bailout
  • 20 percent of FHA loans insured last year — and as many as 24 percent of those from 2007 — faced serious problems including foreclosure
  • Since the bottom fell out of the mortgage market, the FHA has assumed a crucial role in the nation’s housing market. Created in 1934 to help lower-income and first-time buyers purchase homes, the agency now insures roughly 5.4 million single-family home mortgages, with a combined value of $675 billion.
  • The government is giving as many people as it possibly can the chance to buy a house or, if they are in financial difficulty, refinance it. The FHA is insuring about 6,000 loans a day, four times the amount in 2006. Its portfolio is growing so fast that even FHA backers express amazement.
  • The number of FHA mortgage holders in default is 410,916, up 76 percent from 232,864 a year ago (over $1B a day 7.77% of the portfolio is in default, up from 5.6% a year ago)

_____________________

via nytimes.com

A year after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac teetered, industry executives and Washington policy makers are worrying that another government mortgage giant could be the next housing domino.

Back to Business

Not the Same Rules

This series examines the battles taking place to reshape the financial industry.

Problems at the Federal Housing Administration, which guarantees mortgages with low down payments, are becoming so acute that some experts warn the agency might need a federal bailout.

Running questions about the F.H.A.’s future — underscored by interviews with policy makers, analysts and home buyers — came to the fore on Thursday on Capitol Hill. In testimony before a House subcommittee, the F.H.A. commissioner, David H. Stevens, assured lawmakers that his agency would not need a bailout and that it was managing its risks.

But he acknowledged that some 20 percent of F.H.A. loans insured last year — and as many as 24 percent of those from 2007 — faced serious problems including foreclosure, offering a preview of a forthcoming audit of the agency’s finances.

“Let me simply state at the outset that based on current projections, absent any catastrophic home price decline, F.H.A. will not need to ask Congress and the American taxpayer for extraordinary assistance — we will not need a bailout,” Mr. Stevens said in his testimony.

But to its critics, the F.H.A. looks like another Fannie Mae. The hearings on Thursday came on the same day that the federal agency charged with overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided a somber assessment of those giants’ health. In the year since the government stepped in to rescue them, the companies have taken $96 billion from the Treasury, and may need more.

Since the bottom fell out of the mortgage market, the F.H.A. has assumed a crucial role in the nation’s housing market. Created in 1934 to help lower-income and first-time buyers purchase homes, the agency now insures roughly 5.4 million single-family home mortgages, with a combined value of $675 billion.

In addition, these loans are bundled into mortgage-backed securities and guaranteed through the Government National Mortgage Association, known as Ginnie Mae. That means the taxpayer is responsible for paying investors who own Ginnie Mae bonds when F.H.A.-backed mortgages hit trouble.

“It appears destined for a taxpayer bailout in the next 24 to 36 months,” Edward Pinto, a former Fannie Mae executive, said in testimony prepared for the hearing. Mr. Pinto, who was the chief credit officer from 1987 to 1989 for Fannie Mae, went further than most housing analysts and predicted that F.H.A. losses would more than wipe out the agency’s $30 billion of cash reserves.

The issue has polarized Congress. Republicans, who led efforts to rein in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before those companies ran into trouble, are now seeking to bridle the F.H.A. Many Democrats insist the F.H.A. is playing a vital role in the housing market, which is only just starting to stabilize.

“F.H.A. has stepped into the void left by the private market,” Representative Maxine Waters, Democrat from California, said at the hearing. “Let’s be clear; without F.H.A., there would be no mortgage market right now.”

That was the case for Bernadine Shimon. Like many Americans, Ms. Shimon has recently been through some rough times. She lost a house to foreclosure, declared bankruptcy, got divorced and is now a single mother, teaching high school English in a Denver suburb.

She wanted a house but no lender would touch her. The Federal Housing Administration was more obliging. With the F.H.A. insuring her mortgage, Ms. Shimon was able to buy a $134,000 fixer-upper in August.

“The government gave me another chance,” she said.

The government is giving as many people as it possibly can the chance to buy a house or, if they are in financial difficulty, refinance it. The F.H.A. is insuring about 6,000 loans a day, four times the amount in 2006. Its portfolio is growing so fast that even F.H.A. backers express amazement.

For decades it was an article of faith that helping people of limited means like Ms. Shimon get a house was good for the new owner, good for the neighborhood and good for American capitalism. Then came the housing bust, which demonstrated that when lenders allowed people to buy houses they ultimately could not afford, it hurt the parties — while putting the economy itself in a tailspin.

In the aftermath of the crash, there is wide divergence on how easy, or how hard, it should be to become a homeowner. Skittish lenders are asking for 20 percent down, which few prospective borrowers have to spare. As a result, private lending has dwindled.

The government has stepped into the breach, facilitating loans with down payments as low as 3.5 percent and offering other incentives to stabilize the market. Real estate agents in some hard-hit areas say every single one of their clients is using the F.H.A.

“They’re counting their pennies, scraping up that 3.5 percent,” Bonni Malone of Prudential Americana in Las Vegas said. “Mostly they’re buying foreclosed homes from banks, although I had one client who bought from a guy that was dying. It’s turning around the market.”

While the government’s actions have helped avert full-scale economic disaster, there is growing concern that it might have doled out its favors with too generous a hand.

Many of the loans the F.H.A. insured in 2007 and last year are now turning delinquent, agency officials acknowledge. The loans made in those two years are performing “far worse” than newer loans, dragging down the whole portfolio, Mr. Stevens of the F.H.A. said in an interview.

The number of F.H.A. mortgage holders in default is 410,916, up 76 percent from a year ago, when 232,864 were in default, according to agency data.

Despite the agency’s attempt to outrun its fate by insuring ever-larger amounts of new loans to such borrowers as Ms. Shimon — the current rate is over a billion dollars a day — 7.77 percent of the portfolio is in default, up from 5.6 percent a year ago.

Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said in an interview that the defaults were, in essence, worth it.

“I don’t think it’s a bad thing that the bad loans occurred,” he said. “It was an effort to keep prices from falling too fast. That’s a policy.”

The troubled loans are nevertheless weighing on the agency’s capital reserve fund, which has fallen to below its Congressionally mandated minimum of 2 percent, from over 6 percent two years ago.

The optimism expressed by Mr. Stevens, the F.H.A. commissioner, places him at odds not only with some outside experts but with Kenneth Donohue, the inspector general of the Housing and Urban Development Department, who is also F.H.A.’s watchdog. Mr. Donohue said the drop in reserves was “a flashing red light” that the agency was not taking seriously enough.

“It might be we’ll get ourselves out of this and that everything will be fine, but I don’t paint that rosy a picture,” Mr. Donohue said. “They’re banking on the fact that the economy will continue to improve, that the housing market will begin to sustain itself.”

He noted that if private lenders had raised their down payment requirements in the last two years, it raised the question, “what does the F.H.A. think it is doing by asking only 3.5 percent?”

Any more than that and Ms. Shimon, 45, would still be a renter. As it was, she cashed in her retirement savings account to come up with the necessary funds. She did not have enough to spare for closing costs, so her mortgage broker arranged a deal where the charges were wrapped into the loan at the cost of a higher interest rate. She cried when the deal was done.

The house was empty and trashed. Slowly, she is trying to bring it back to life. She spent the first few weeks picking up garbage in the backyard.

Is Ms. Shimon a good bet? Even she has no easy answer. Her mortgage payment, $1,100, is half of what she takes home every month. It is not easy to make ends meet. Teachers can get laid off like everyone else.

“The government,” she said, “is doing what it needed to do — taking a risk on people.”

Chaz Fullenkamp, an automotive technician in Columbus, Ohio, got an F.H.A. loan even though he was living on the financial edge. “If I got unemployed, I’d be wiped out in a month or two,” he says. Thanks to the F.H.A., however, he is better off than he used to be.

Mr. Fullenkamp used F.H.A. insurance to buy a house this spring for $179,000. The eager seller paid the closing costs and also gave Mr. Fullenkamp $2,500 in cash. He immediately applied for the $8,000 tax rebate. Even taking his down payment into account, he came out ahead.

“I knew in my heart I could not really afford the house, but they gave it to me anyway,” said Mr. Fullenkamp, 22. “I thought, ‘Wow, I’m surprised I pulled that off.’ ”

As the number of loans has soared, random quality control checks have decreased sharply, F.H.A. staff members say. Mr. Donohue, the inspector general, cited numerous examples of organized fraud in testimony to Congress earlier this year.

“They need to stop taking bad loans in the door,” he said in an interview. “They’re taking on all this volume, they have to have very active underwriting standards.”

Filed under: Bailout

markmadsen says...

via mandelman.ml-implode.com

The press is certainly changing their view of what’s going on with loan modifications, no question about that.

And by George, I think he’s got it!  Chris Adams, a writer for McClatchy Newspapers has a headline today that reads: Firms Are Getting Billions, But Homeowners Still in Trouble, and I feel like celebrating… like doing the “Oh What a Feeling” Toyota jump, if you remember the television commercial from years back.  I feel like I could moonwalk.  Not in public, or anything, but in my mind I’m moon-walking like MJ.

Chris Adams’ article starts with the following:

The federal government is engaged in a massive mortgage modification program that’s on track to send billions in tax dollars to many of the very companies that judges or regulators have cited in recent years for abusive mortgage practices.  The firms, called mortgage servicers, have been cited for badgering, manipulating or lying to their customers; sticking them with bogus fees, or improperly foreclosing on them.

Those of you that have read my column for some time should know exactly how I’m feeling right now.  Let’s see… cloud nine comes to mind.  Maybe not quite euphoria, but it’s in the ballpark.  Chris goes on to say:

The reliance on such companies points to an ironic paradox for federal regulators: Cleaning up the nation’s financial crisis often rewards the firms that helped create the mess. Those Wall Street banks and mortgage servicing companies argue that they’re best positioned to repair the damage they’ve helped cause.

Is that what they argue?  That they’re “best positioned”?  I’m quite sure they do.  I bet they’re “best positioned” for lots of things that involve money and them controlling it.  Go on Chris, my boy…

To make matters worse, the Government Accountability Office, Congress’ watchdog, has said that the Treasury Department hasn’t done enough to oversee the companies participating in what’s known as the Home Affordable Modification Program, which emerged from the bank bailout bill Congress passed last fall.

I’ll say.  That they haven’t done enough, I mean.  Chris quotes Irwin Trauss, an attorney who represents low-income homeowners for Philadelphia Legal Assistance as saying that Bank of America, at least through July, told homeowners that they couldn’t participate in the program when they should’ve been allowed to do so, and he alleges that Saxon Mortgage forced one of his clients into bankruptcy without providing a valid reason for turning down her modification request.  According to Trauss:

“Servicers look for reasons to avoid making the modifications when they are most needed, rather than for opportunities to make them.”

You don’t say.  Do tell… Does he mean that the servicers don’t want to modify loans?  I can’t believe that.  And here I was sure that they wanted to modify mortgages, but they were just overwhelmed.  And what about those incentives?  Is he saying that the servicers don’t care about the $1500 offered by the Obama Administration for modifying a loan?  I find that hard to believe.  I mean… $1500 is a lot of money, right?

Chris introduces us to a couple, Donna and Ronnie Fruia, of Troutman, N.C., who he explains learned firsthand how difficult it can be to get a loan modified.  You should read it for yourself, but just so you know, it’s about Citi Financial and the last line of their story is: “I know if the banking commissioner hadn’t gotten involved, it wouldn’t have happened.”

He then explains that loan modifications are time consuming and that it may be easier and less expensive for servicers to foreclose than to try to keep someone in their home.  He quoted someone who said that servicver employees often see their job as being akin to a bill collector, and that “some have been known to hang up on callers if they started to get tough questions.”

Chris quoted Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller as saying that by September 2008, as the economy went into freefall, the mortgage industry’s efforts had been “profoundly disappointing.”

“Too many homeowners face foreclosure without receiving any meaningful assistance by their mortgage servicer, a reality that is growing worse rather than better,” said a report from the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group.

And he quoted the assistant Iowa attorney general, who said that:

“The mortgage industry has responded to this crisis with a series of half steps based on a notion that a turnaround in the housing market was just around the corner.”

Okay, everybody just freeze right there.  Hold everything. This is the first time I’ve read this sentence, and after reading about the crisis every single day for a year, it’s hard to find a sentence I haven’t already read in one form or another.  What a time not to be able to use the phrase “F#@k Me”.

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Is this even possible?  Is that what this group of remedial readers have been thinking?  You want to know something?  It crossed my mind once or twice, but I let the thought go because it seemed that no group of people could possible be that stupid.  But… maybe not.  We are talking about the mortgage industry, after all, and if any industry is capable of that kind of breathtaking stupidity, it would have to be the mortgage industry, right?  I’m not trying to be mean or unfair, and I will certainly admit that I’ve met some brilliant and wonderful people in the mortgage industry, but come on… you know what I’m saying.  It’s an industry with highs and lows that make the Andes look like Kansas.

I think Madigan just might have something here… they’ve been acting in this half ass way because the idiots that run the mortgage servicers actually thought, and probably still think, that the real estate market is coming back sometime soon.  Oh, dear Lord, if it wasn’t so incredibly poignant, it might just be the funniest thing I’ve ever heard.

It starts the mind a-reelin’ doesn’t it?  I wonder if the banks think they’re going to be solvent again sometime soon too?  Do you suppose these clown princes of finance actually think that they’re out of the woods and won’t have to be thrown into receivership after the midterms are over?  Seriously?  Is it even possible?  Do you suppose they think that none of their buds are going to jail at some point… you know… for breaking the world with their bullshit?  They must know, right?  No?  Oh my God… too funny.  Things are looking up indeed.  I was feeling kind of down about the whole deflationary collapse thing for a while there, but just thinking that these guys think they’ve gotten away with this is lifting my spirits big time.

Chris… I’m going to be reading a lot more of your stuff buddy boy.

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The article then talks about the Treasury’s mortgage modification program, pointing out that investors, servicers and homeowners all get to share in the $20 billion that the federal government estimates it could spend to keep homes out of foreclosure.  $20 billion?  Wowie zowie… not a whole $20 billion.  That’s almost as much money as Citigroup lost last March.

Chris points out that the GAO has found that the Treasury Department wasn’t doing enough to monitor the process, stating that in a July report, the GAO said that the department had “significant gaps in its oversight structure,” and was short-staffed in the office monitoring the modification program.  And check out these pearls of precious wisdom:

As of July — eight months into the program — the Treasury had filled fewer than half the positions in a key modification office.

“Treasury cannot identify, assess and address risks associated with servicers that lack the capacity to fulfill all program requirements.”

Treasury said it’s beefing up its review procedures and also said it recognizes many of the problems and has been working to correct them. “Clearly, we’re not there yet,” said Seth Wheeler, one of the Treasury officials who oversees the modification effort. “Clearly there’s still inconsistent application of the program, even though we have made progress.”

Now… here’s where it gets really good.  And I’m going to do something I don’t usually do, lift a significant portion of Chris’ article so I can comment on it.  It’s just that good.

Several companies in the Treasury program have been cited by judges or regulators for having engaged in improper behavior with their customers.

They include Select Portfolio Servicing Inc., a Utah-based company formerly known as Fairbanks Capital Corp.; Countrywide Home Loans Inc., now a unit of Bank of America Corp.; Carrington Mortgage Services LLC, based in California; Saxon Mortgage Services Inc., a unit of Morgan Stanley; EMC Mortgage Corp., now a subsidiary of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; and Green Tree Servicing, a Minnesota company.

Ocwen Financial Corp., a Florida-based company that services more than 300,000 mortgages nationwide, could receive more than $200 million in TARP payments.

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“Ocwen has screwed up my finances so bad you can’t believe it,” said Brad Rhoton , whose rental properties in the Houston suburbs are part of a nationwide lawsuit against Ocwen. “It’s been the most maddening process you can imagine.”  Rhoton’s lawsuit charges that Ocwen constantly misapplied Rhoton’s mortgage payments and tacked on unnecessary fees and insurance, causing his accounts to fall behind.

So far under the Treasury’s modification program, Ocwen has started trial modifications in 8 percent of potential mortgages — below the national average and well below some other servicers.

Paul Koches , a company spokesman, said the number is misleadingly low.  Ocwen, he said, has set rigorous standards in documenting its modifications and is therefore likely to have a far higher share of its modifications stick than other companies. He said that Ocwen undertook its own loan modification program in 2007 and has beefed up its staff substantially since then.

As for the suits against it, Koches said they represent a fraction of the firm’s customer base, and many were copycat lawsuits that tried to paint Ocwen with the same brush as other mortgage servicer firms. He said the company continues to vigorously defend itself against lawsuits.

Over the years, Ocwen has lost other lawsuits and has been slapped down by a federal judge for its conduct.

In one Texas bankruptcy case, for example, a federal judge blasted Ocwen after it tried to pass the cost of a $1,000 sanction onto the customer it was cited for mistreating. When the judge found out, he said, “Ocwen’s course of conduct in this proceeding bordered on the outrageous.” He fined the company an additional $27,500.

Are you reading this?  This is just toooooooo much, don’t you think?  Watch out bankers… I told you… you’re not going to stay on top of lies you’ve been telling forever.  This is America baby, and eventually the press finds its balls.

The case was far from isolated, however. A jury in Galveston, Texas, ordered the company to pay $11.5 million, and one down the coast in Corpus Christi ordered it to pay $3 million for unfairly foreclosing on homeowners (both cases were then settled in the appeals process for undisclosed amounts).

In both cases, the plaintiffs were on the edge financially, and so when Ocwen added extra fees to their accounts they quickly fell behind.

That was part of their strategy, plaintiffs’ attorneys said. One of the key witnesses before both juries was a former Ocwen account officer who said the company trained its sights on customers who had substantial equity in their homes. In those cases, the company had the most to gain if customers lost their homes in foreclosure.

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“We didn’t treat the people very well, but the money was pretty good,” the former account officer, Ron Davis, testified during one of the trials. (Davis couldn’t be reached for further comment.)

The motive, he said, was simple: force people into foreclosure as a way to earn higher bonuses.  “We would call the customers and ask them what bridge they were going to live under,” Davis testified.

Shut up. Shut up. Shut up.  I may not recover from this.  I could end up with a permanent smile.

Ocwen lost that lawsuit. A Texas jury found that the company engaged in “fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading” tactics that it called “unconscionable.” The case involved an elderly Texas woman the bank tried to evict from her home even after a local judge had ordered it not to. The jury awarded her $11.5 million , which was reduced to $1.8 million , according to Ocwen’s Securities and Exchange Commission filings; the case was settled during appeals.

Outside the courts, federal regulators in 2004 approached Ocwen to request that the company enter into a formal supervisory agreement under which it promised to improve its customer service. It required, for example, that Ocwen beef up its ombudsman to take customer complaints; adopt a “borrower-oriented customer service commitment plan”; take reasonable actions to see if homeowners already have hazard insurance before adding it to customers’ accounts; and regularly report to federal regulators about outstanding customer complaints.

Koches of Ocwen said the agreement was merely an attempt to formalize many of the steps the company was already taking — and that the company and federal regulators wanted to avoid the kind of problems other firms had experienced.

Oh did they now… I’ll bet they did.

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Later that year, however, Ocwen took steps to ensure that such regulatory decisions wouldn’t come again.

It successfully petitioned to have itself removed from oversight by the Office of Thrift Supervision, thus ending the supervisory agreement hatched just months before, according to Ocwen’s regulatory filings.

Ocwen said it removed itself from OTS oversight for business reasons unrelated to the supervisory agreement and that it continues to follow the intent of the agreement.

Okay, that’s enough.  Now I’d like to wrap things up by reprinting a sentence that appeared above, but Im think makes for a very good capper.  Here it is:

Ocwen Financial Corp., a Florida-based company that services more than 300,000 mortgages nationwide, could receive more than $200 million in TARP payments.

That’s it and that’s all.  Go get ‘em Chris baby.  Reel them in and filet them.  As to my readers… please tell me you know what to do with this article.

Mandelman Out.

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P.S. Oh yeah… I wrote an article similar to Chris’ some months ago… just for the record and all.

Suits Filed Against Sleazy Servicers – Treasury Knew

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Mark Madsen - Las Vegas Mortgage

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